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WHAT HAVE YOU DONE FOR ME LATELY?




Suppose a resident of New Jersey creates an irrevocable inter
vivos trust.' The settlor subsequently dies while a resident of
New Jersey. Pursuant to the terms of her will, which is probat-
ed in New Jersey, her entire estate is paid to the trust. After a
few years, one of the two trustees is a New York resident, the
other is a resident of Connecticut. The trust's assets, intangi-
bles such as stock in Delaware corporations, are held by the
New York trustee in New York. All of the income beneficiaries
of the trust reside in New York or Connecticut.2
Question: To what state, if any, must the trust pay income
tax?
By New Jersey statute, this trust is defined as a New Jersey
"Resident Trust" because it is'an inter vivos trust created by a
resident of New Jersey.' New Jersey taxes Resident Trusts on
the entire income of the trust, subject to the usual deductions
allowed to trusts.4 In contrast, were the trust classified as a
* Associate, Kramer, Levin, Naftalis & Frankel, New York, New York. BA.,
1990, New York University, J.D., 1994, Columbia University; LLML (Taxation) Candi-
date, May 1998, New York University. The author wishes to thank Bella L.F.
Sanevich for her assistance with this article.
1. An inter vivos trust is a trust created by an individual (often referred to as
the "settlor" or "trustor") during her lifetime, as compared to a testamentary trust
which is created under an individual's will and becomes effective at the time of her
death. See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 821 (6th ed. 1990).
2. The facts of this example are loosely based on the New Jersey Tax Court
decision in Potter v. Taxation Div. Dir., 5 N.J. Tax 399 (1983).
3. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54A1-2CoX3Xa) (West 1986).
4. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54A-2-1 (West 1986). In addition to the usual deduc-
tions allowed to individuals, trusts are typically allowed a deduction for distributions
of income made to beneficiaries. Since the beneficiary will commonly pay income tax
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non-Resident, it would be subject to income taxation by the
State of New Jersey solely on income derived from sources in
New Jersey, i.e., New Jersey source income.5 New York, Con-
necticut and Delaware each define "Resident Trust" in a similar
fashion as New Jersey.' Further, like New Jersey, New York,
Connecticut and Delaware each tax Resident Trusts on all in-
come and non-Resident Trusts only on the trust's source in-
come.7 Since the only asset held by the trust is stock in Dela-
ware corporations, the income from which is neither New York,
Connecticut, nor Delaware source income, none of those states
tax the trust's income.' Therefore, pursuant to each of their
statutes, New Jersey imposes an income tax on the entire in-
come of the trust, but New York, Connecticut and Delaware do
not tax any of the trust's income.
The New Jersey Tax Court, when confronted with this sce-
nario, held that the income tax imposed by New Jersey on such
a trust violates the due process clause of the United States
Constitution.9 The Court held that there was no "nexus" be-
tween New Jersey and the trust during the relevant tax years;
therefore, New Jersey was constitutionally prevented from tax-
ing this trust. Since New York, Connecticut and Delaware do
not impose an income tax on this trust, although they could do
on the distributions made to her, the deduction at the trust level prevents double
taxation. This structure is similar under both the federal tax system and under that
of most states. See I.R.C. §§ 642, 651, 662 (1997); Note, State Taxation of Trust In-
come, 2 REAL PROP., PROB. AND TR J. 141, 144 (1967).
5. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54A.2-1.1 (West 1986). The income tax imposed by New
Jersey on non-residents is equal to the tax that would have been imposed had the
taxpayer been a resident multiplied by a fraction. The denominator of the fraction is
the taxpayer's gross income from all sources and the numerator is the taxpayer's
New Jersey source income. Id.
New Jersey source income includes, inter alia, income from New Jersey real
property and income derived from employment in New Jersey. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
54A.5-8(1), 54A.5-8(2) (West 1986 & Supp. 1997).
6. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-701(a)(4) (West 1993); 30 DEL CODE ANN.
tit. 30, § 1136(a) (1997); N.Y. TAX LAW § 605(bX3) (Consol. 1990 & Supp. 1997).
7. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-711, -713 (West 1993); DEL CODE ANN. tit.
30, §§ 1121, 1141 (1997); N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 631, 633 (Consol. 1990 & Supp. 1997).
8. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-711(b) (West 1993); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 30,
§§ 1121, 1122, 1124 (1997); N.Y. TAX LAW § 631(b) (Consol. 1990 & Supp. 1997).
For most purposes, Delaware source income does not include income derived
from stock in Delaware corporations. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1124(c) (1997).
9. See Potter v. Taxation Div. Dir., 5 N.J. Tax 399, 404-405 (1983).
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so unembarrassed by the United States Constitution,0 the
trust wholly escapes state income taxation.
Would it matter if the trust was a testamentary trust created
under the will of a New Jersey resident? The New Jersey Tax
Court has held it would not. Further, the fact that some of
the contingent beneficiaries'2 of the trust were New Jersey
residents did not provide sufficient nexus for New Jersey to
constitutionally tax the trust."
The preceding examples are loosely based on two New Jersey
Tax Court cases decided the same day-Pennoyer and Potter.
The focus of this article is the issue addressed in Pennoyer and
Potter and numerous other state court decisions. Namely, can a
state constitutionally tax a trust based solely on the residence
of the settlor, in the case of an inter vivos trust, or the testa-
tor,"' in the case of a testamentary trust, if there is no other
connection between the taxing state and the trust during the
tax year?. The numerous courts that have addressed this issue
have reached decisions that are not wholly consistent with one
another. Further, in January 1997, the United States Court of
Appeals for the. District of Columbia Circuit addressed this
issue and opined 5 that the earlier decisions have been over-
ruled by the 1992 Supreme Court case Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota.
10. See Greenough v. Tax Assessors, 331 U.S. 486 (1947) (holding that a state
may tax a trust based on the residence of the trustees); New York ex rel. Whitney v.
Graves, 299 U.S. 366 (1937) (holding that a state may constitutionally tax a non-res-
ident on income derived from sources in that state).
11. See Pennoyer v. Taxation Div. Dir., 5 N.J. Tax 386 (1983).
12. A contingent beneficiary is a beneficiary that will benefit only upon the hap-
pening of some event, for example, a remainder person that receives the principal of
the trust only if she is living at the death of the income (current) beneficiary. See
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 321 (6th ed. 1990).
13. See Potter, 5 N.J. Tax at 404.
14. Traditionally, the term "testator" has been used to describe a male who has
died leaving a will (i.e., testate) and the term "testatrix! has been used to describe a
female leaving a will. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1475 (6th ed. 1990). The trend,
however, has been to use the term "testator" to refer to both genders. For grammati-
cal ease, as well as to avoid the gendered term, this article will use the term "testa-
tar" to refer to males and females indiscriminately.
15. See District of Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d 539, 545 (D.C.
Cir. 1997).
16. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
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Courts that have addressed this issue have likened taxation
of such a trust to the imposition of an income tax on an indi-
vidual born in the taxing state for the rest of that individual's
life, irrespective of her residence." In contrast, in holding that
such a tax is constitutional, the tax has been likened to the
imposition of an income tax upon a corporation by the state of
incorporation." Under this theory, the trust, like a corporation,
owes its existence to the law of the taxing state and, thus, may
be taxed by that state. Neither of these analogies are wholly
satisfactory." At the risk of oversimplifying the issue, it is
evident that a trust is neither a corporation nor an individual
and, thus, the constitutional basis of a state income tax on an
individual or corporation is not necessarily a constitutional
basis for the imposition of state income tax on a trust.
In these cases, if the trust is not taxed by the state of resi-
dence of the settlor/testator, the trust will frequently wholly
escape state income taxation. While this result may seem ineq-
uitable at first blush, it is important to recognize that this
arguable unfairness is not constitutionally significant.'o Sim-
ply, the United States Constitution does not require that an
entity be subject to state income tax. If it did, states that im-
pose no income tax would be forced to adopt an income tax.
This would be an unexpected result, especially in a state such
as Florida in which the imposition of an income tax is prohibit-
ed by the state constitution."
The issue of the constitutionality of a state income tax based
solely on the residence of the settlor/testatorm at the time of
17. See Blue v. Department of Treasury, 462 N.W.2d 762, 764-65 (Mich. Ct. App.
1990).
18. See Chase Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d at 543-45.
19. See infra notes 156-76 and accompanying text.
20. See Westfall v. Director of Revenue, 812 S.W.2d 513, 517 (Mo. 1991) (en bane)
(Blackmar, J., dissenting) ("The director argues that if the trust income from intangi-
bles is not subject to taxation in Missouri it will not be taxed anywhere. I am unable
to see how this is demonstrated from the record before us but, even if it is, it makes
no difference. We are concerned here only with Missouri's power to tax.").
21. See FLa CONST. art. 7, § 5(a). Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas,
Washington and Wyoming impose no state income tax. See State Tax Guide (CCH).
22. Technically, the taxation of a testamentary trust is based on the residence of
the testator at the time of her death. For grammatical ease, however, this article will
frequently refer to the residence of the settlor/testator at the time of creation of the
trust.
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the creation of the trust has been addressed by several courts
over the past hundred years.' Despite the fact that the issue
has not arisen frequently, it is likely to come before various
state courts more frequently in the future due to external fac-
tors. Namely, it has been said so many times that it borders on
the trite to claim that this is an increasingly mobile society.
Individuals are less likely to remain residents of the state (or
even the nation) of their birth than they were years ago. Fur-
ther, the rule against perpetuities, which limits the duration
of a trust, has been repealed, or greatly limited, in several
states.' These two factors should increase the frequency with
23. See generally District of Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d 539
(D.C. Cir. 1997); City of Augusta v. Kimball, 40 A. 666 (Me. 1898); Westfall v. Direc-
tor of Revenue, 812 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. 1991); Blue v. Department of the Treasury, 462
N.W.2d 762 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990); Swift v. Director of Revenue, 727 S.W.2d 880 (Mo.
1987) (en hanc); Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Murphy, 15 N.Y.S.2d 579
(N.Y. 1964); Taylor v. New York State Taxation Comm'n, 445 N.Y.S.2d 648 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1981); Potter v. Taxation Div. Dir., 5 N.J. Tax 399 (1983); Pennoyer v.
Taxation Div. Dir., 5 N.J. Tax 386 (1983); First Natl Bank of Boston v. Harvey, 16
A.2d 184 (Vt. 1940); Bayfield County v. Pishon, 162 Wis. 466 (Wis. 1916). Harvey,
Pishon and Kimba/ did not, however, address the constitutional issues concerning the
taxation of such a trust.
In Hutchins v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, 172 N.E. 605
(Mass. 1930), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed the issue of the
constitutionality of a Massachusetts income tax based on the residence of the trust-
ees. In dicta, the court addressed the issue of the state income taxation of a trust
based solely on the residence of the testator. The holding of Hutchins, which invali-
dated a Massachusetts income tax on the entire income of a trust based on the Mas-
sachusetts residence of less than all of the trustees, is at least partially inconsistent
with Greenough v. Tax Assessors, 331 U.S. 486 (1947), which was decided by the
United States Supreme Court seventeen years later. In Greenough, the Court held
that a state may tax the income of a trust based on the residence of less than all of
the trustees in such state. See id. at 498. Further, the decision in Hutchins was par-
tially based on the risk of double taxation. Nine years after Hutchins, the United
States Supreme Court held that double taxation is not constitutionally prohibited. See
Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 365-68 (1939).
This issue has also been addressed by the Virginia Department of Taxation. See
Virginia Department of Taxation Letter Ruling, 1993 WL 372991 (Aug. 26, 1993).
24. The rule against perpetuities states that an interest must vest, if it is to vest
at all, within 21 years after the death of a life in being at the creation of the inter-
est See ELIAS CLARK ET AL., GRATUITOus TRANSFERS 744-83 (3d ed. 1985). While a
detailed explanation of this rule is not appropriate here, the basic result is that the
rule against perpetuities limits the duration of a trust.
25. These states include: Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.050 (Michie 1997)); Dela-
ware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 503 (1989 & Supp. 1996)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 55-
111 (1997)); South Dakota (S.D. CODwD LAws § 43-5-8 (Michie 1997)); and Wiscon-
sin (9IS. STAT. ANN. § 700.16(5) (West 1981 & Supp. 1997)). See also Carolyn T.
Geer, Is Your Trust Well Placed?, FORBES, June 16, 1997 at 190. The trend toward
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which this issue is raised before state courts. First, the fact
that an individual is less likely to remain a resident of his
state of birth, which is likely to be his ancestors' state of resi-
dence, makes it more likely that trust beneficiaries and/or
trustees, who are frequently the descendants of the set-
tlor/testator, will reside outside the state of creation of the
trust. Moreover, this possibility is increased by the fact that,
considering the trend toward repeal of the rule against perpetu-
ities, a trust may exist for a substantial length of time, or even
indefinitely.'c
While this issue has received attention from state courts, and
is increasingly likely to be the subject of further state litigation,
it has received relatively little attention from commentatorsY
This may be due to the fact that a trust that distributes all of
its income will, frequently, pay no income tax.' Thus, the
state (and federal) income tax liability of a trust may be minor.
This lack of attention is unfortunate, however, since trusts are
unique in that state income taxation of a trust is frequently
based on the creation of the trust-an event that potentially
occurred long before a particular tax year. This makes the con-
stitutional limits on the income taxation of trusts particularly
repeal of the rule against perpetuities seems to be gaining momentum. Thus, it
appears likely that this list will soon be out of date.
A South Dakota trust company advertises that as a South Dakota trustee, it
will administer a trust and keep the trust "going strong" through the year 2238.
Advertisement of Norwest Investment Management & Trust, TRUSsTS & ESTATES, July
1996, at 15.
26. This new found freedom is somewhat mitigated, however, by the federal gen-
eration-skipping transfer tax. See I.R.C. § 2601 (1997). As a gross oversimplification,
this tax is imposed on transfers, either outright or in trust, to grandchildren or more
remote descendants of the transferor. There is, however, a one million dollar exemp-
tion against this tax. Thus, it is a common estate planning technique for wealthy
individuals to place one million dollars in a trust to pay income to grandchildren and
more remote issue. See generally JEROME A. MANNING ET AL., MANNING ON ESTATE
PLANNING 6-30 to 6-34 (5th ed., 1995). Currently, no states impose a state generation-
skipping tax.
27. See Eileen Caulfield Schwab & William P. LaPiana, The Income Taxation of
New York Resident Trust, N.Y. ST. B.J., March/April 1996, at 30 (discussing the New
York State Department of Finance and Taxation regulations concerning this issue). As
discussed infra, these regulations were passed in response to litigation in the New
York State courts concerning the constitutional limitations or state taxation of trusts.
See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
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interesting, even if the stakes are sometimes, but certainly not
always, small.
An issue that has drawn the attention of commentators is
the so-called situs of a trust.' The situs of a trust is, general-
ly, the place of performance of the duties of the trustees, i.e.,
the jurisdiction where the trustees and the bulk of the trust
assets are located."0 The components of the trust's situs, such
as the residence of the trustees, are relevant to the issue of
whether or not a particular state may constitutionally tax a
trust and they will be discussed in that context. Trusts, howev-
er, are generally taxed based on the residence of the set-
tlor/testator and not based on their situs31
Part two of this article will discuss the statutory framework
of the state taxation of trusts. Particularly, it will explore the
distinction, alluded to earlier, between Resident and non-Resi-
dent Trusts that is made by many states, such as New Jersey.
The purpose of part two is not to provide a state-by-state exege-
sis of the law regarding the state taxation of trusts-that pur-
pose is best left to Commerce Clearing House. 2 Instead, part
two will examine, in broad brush, the basic structure of trust
income taxation by the states.
Part three of this article will discuss the 1929 United States
Supreme Court case Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia,"
which held that Virginia may not impose an ad valorem ' tax
on an inter vivos trust that was created by a Virginia resident,
since the trustee was a resident of Maryland. While this case
seems especially relevant to the issue discussed herein, many
state court cases that address this issue fail to even cite it. 5
29. See, e.g., HENDRiCKSON & SiLVERmAN, CHANGING THE SITuS OF A TRUST
(1992).
30. See id. § 1.01.
31. See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
32. See generally State Tax Reporter Series (CCH).
33. 280 U.S. 83 (1929).
34. An ad valorem tax is a tax imposed "according to value," that is, based on
the value of property. The most common type of ad valorem tax is the real property
tax imposed by many states; however, an ad valorem tax may be imposed on any
property, real or personal, tangible or intangible. See BLACiKS LAw DICTIONARY 51
(6th ed. 1990).
35. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d 539 (D.C.
Cir. 1997); Blue v. Department of the Treasury, 462 N.W.2d 762 (Mich. Ct. App.
1998]
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Part four explores the background of constitutional limita-
tions on state taxation as established by other United States
Supreme Court precedents. Particular mention will be made of
the 1992 United States Supreme Court case Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota."5 Quill, which involved the constitutionality of a
North Dakota use tax on a mail order house located outside of
North Dakota, distinguished between the nexus requirement of
the due process clause of the United States Constitution and
the nexus requirement of the commerce clause. In explaining
this distinction, the Quill Court noted that the two clauses are
aimed at different constitutional concerns and, thus, are not, as
had been previously thought, coextensive.3"
In January 1997, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit addressed the issue of the District's
imposition of an income tax on a trust based solely on the resi-
dence of the testator at the time of his death, and opined that
Quill had overruled all of the earlier cases that had held that
such a tax was unconstitutional.3
Part five will apply the relevant standards to the issue at
hand; namely, the constitutionality of a state's imposition of an
income tax on a trust that has little or no connection to the
taxing state other than the fact that the settlor/testator was a
resident of the taxing state. In this part, the distinction
between inter vivos and testamentary trusts, and the arguably
closer relationship between a state and a testamentary trust
will be explored.39 Further, the differences between the nexus
requirements of the due process and commerce clauses will be
discussed. The analogies that have been used by the state
courts to analyze this issue will also be reviewed. Part five will
also argue that the attempts to constitutionally justify income
taxation of a trust based on certain connections, such as the
1990); Westfall v. Director of Revenue, 812 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. 1991); Potter v. Taxation
Div. Dir., 5 N.J. Tax 399 (1983).
36. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
37. Justice White argued that this "newly created" distinction was not supported
by the evolution of the law regarding these two clauses. Id. at 325 (White, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
38. See Chase Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d at 545.
39. See id. at 547 n.1l.
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jurisdiction of the state courts, rely on flawed and circular rea-
soning.
In part six, policy issues concerning the imposition of state
income tax in this situation will be discussed. This section will
review the fairness of the imposition of an income tax on a
trust by a state with little connection between the two. Alterna-
tive bases for taxation will also be explored.
Part seven will discuss some of the "Trustee Issues" that
would arise from a conclusion that a state may not constitution-
ally tax a trust if the only connection between the trust and
the taxing state is the residence of the settlor/testator. These
"Trustee Issues" include whether a trustee may be removed if
that trustee's residence is the sole basis for a state's continuing
jurisdiction to tax a trust and the issue of who is a trustee for
constitutional purposes.
Part eight of this article will conclude and, in order to avoid
spoiling the end of this "story," nothing further will be said
about part eight at this time.
I. STRUCTURE OF STATE TAX LAWS REGARDING THE
INCOME TAXATION OF TRUSTS
Generally, states have modeled their statutes regarding the
income taxation of trusts after the federal provisions.' By fol-
lowing the federal system, the states, by and large, attempt to
40. See JEROME R. HELmWsrEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION
20.90 (2d ed. 1992).
To the extent the states deviate from the federal system, the deviations fre-
quently eliminate some of the complexities contained in the federal system. See Note,
State Taxation of Trust Income, supra note 4, at 144. For example, many states do
not provide for an analog of the "throwback rule" contained in the Internal Revenue
Code. See HitMSTEiN & HELLERSTEIN, supra, 1 20.90. The federal throwback rule,
generally, involves the taxation of distributions by the trust of income that-has been
accumulated in earlier years. See ILC. §§ 665-668 (1997); ARTHUR M. MICHAELSON &
JONATHAN G. BLATrMACHR, INCOME TAXATION OF ESTATES & TRUSTS at 2-36 to 2-51
(1995).
The throwback rule was originally adopted as an anti-abuse provision to pre-
vent taxpayers from taking advantage of the then-lower income rates for trusts by
accumulating income in the trust so that the income tax is paid by the trust rather
than by the beneficiary. See MICHAEISON & BLAT1MACHR, supra, at 2-28. The federal
throwback rule was largely repealed by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. See H..
2014, 105th Cong. § 507 (1997).
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tax trusts like individuals.4 Of course, there are numerous dif-
ferences between the income taxation of individuals and trusts
due to the fundamental differences in their nature; for example,
trusts generally receive an income tax deduction for administra-
tion expenses, such as trustee commissions.42 The most impor-
tant difference, however, is that for both federal and, for the
most part, state purposes, a trust will receive an income tax
deduction for distributions made to a beneficiary.' Correspond-
ingly, the beneficiary will be taxed on distributions of income
received from the trust." Therefore, if a trust distributes all of
its taxable income, then, under the federal tax system, as well
as the tax systems imposed by many states, the trust will re-
ceive an income tax deduction that is equal to the distributions
made to the beneficiaries, which, in turn, is equal to the whole
of its taxable income. Thus, the trust may pay no state or fed-
eral income tax.4'
This system of allowing a deduction to the trust for distribu-
tions of income received by the beneficiaries maintains a single
level of income tax amongst the trust and the beneficiaries. In
contrast, dividends paid from a corporation are taxed at both
the corporate and at the shareholder level.' On the other end
of the spectrum, a partner will report a fractional share of the
41. See I.R.C. § 641(d) (1997); Note, State Taxation of Trust Income, supra note 4,
at 144.
42. See MICHAELsON & BLATTMACHR, supra note 40, at 80.
43. See LR.C. §§ 651, 661 (1997); Note, State Taxation of Trust Income, supra
note 4, at 144. Generally, this deduction is limited to the extent of the trust's distrib-
utable net income (DNI). See generally, MICHAEISON & BIA rMAcHR, supra note 40,
at 2-45 to 2-53. The mechanics of DNI, however, are not relevant to the current dis-
cussion.
44. See I.I.C. §§ 652, 662 (1997); Note, State Taxation of Trust Income, supra
note 4, at 146. The amount of income the beneficiary must include in his taxable in-
come is' also limited to the extent of the trust's DNI. See MICHAELSON &
BLATTMACHR, supra note 40, at 2-45.
45. If during a particular tax year a trust has both capital gain and ordinary
income, then, even if the trust distributes all of the income and all of the gain, the
trust will typically owe income tax on its capital gain. This is due to the fact that
capital gain is, typically, not included in DNI, and DNI is a limit on both the taxable
income reported by the beneficiaries and the deduction received by the trust. See
I.R.C. § 643(aX3); Treas. Reg. § 1.643(a)-3; Note, State Taxation of Trust Income,
supra note 4, at 144; see also supra notes 43-44.
46. See 1996 U.S. Master Tax Guide (CCH) S 201 (1995).
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partnership's taxable income regardless of whether the income
is distributed.47
In an attempt to tax trusts in a fashion that is similar to the
taxation of individuals, states frequently distinguish between
Resident and non-Resident Trusts. While the definitions vary,
they are generally based on the residence of the settlor, in the
case of an inter vivos trust, or the testator, in the case of a
testamentary trust. The District of Columbia definition is typi-
cal.
For the purposes of this subchapter, estates and trusts
are: (1) resident estates or trusts; or (2) nonresident estates
or trusts. If the decedent was at the time of his death do-
miciled within the District, his estate is a resident estate,
and any trust created by his will is a resident trust. If the
decedent was not at the time of his death domiciled within
the District, his estate is a nonresident estate, and any
trust created by his will is a nonresident trust. If the cre-
ator of a trust was at the time the trust was created domi-
ciled within the District, or if the trust consists of property
of a person domiciled within the District, the trust is a
resident trust. If the creator of the trust was not at the
time the trust was created domiciled within the District,
the trust is a nonresident trust... . 48
Generally, states that make the distinction between Resident
and non-Resident Trusts provide definitions that are similar to
the District of Columbia definition quoted above.49 For the
most part, if a testamentary trust is created under the will of a
resident of the state, then it is a "Resident Trust" for income
tax purposes. Similarly, an inter vivos trust will be considered
a "Resident Trust" if, at the time of the trust's creation, the
settlor was a resident of that state.
47. See id.; IR.C. §§ 701, 702, 704 (1997).
48. D.C. STAT. § 47-1809.1 (1997 Repl Vol.).
49. See, eg., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-22-103(10) (West 1997) (Colorado defines
any trust administered in Colorado as a Resident Trust); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 30,
§ 1136(a) (West 1997); 35 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. 5/1501(aX20) (West 1996 & Supp.
1997); MiCE. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 206.18(c) (West 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 143.331
(West 1995); QKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 2353(6) (1992 & Supp. 1998); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
72, § 7301(s) (Law. Co-op 1990 & Supp. 1997); R.L GEN. LAWS § 44-30-5(c) (1995).
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These definitions provide the basis of the issues discussed in
this article. A trust is determined to be a Resident or non-Resi-
dent Trust ab initio. This categorization, and the concomitant
state income tax liabilities, then remain with the trust through-
out its existence. Thus, for example, the District of Columbia
may tax the income of a trust despite the fact that the basis of
the tax, the creation of the trust by a District resident, oc-
curred fifty-three years before the tax year.0 Further, the
same definition would provide for a state's imposition of an
income tax on a trust based solely on the fact that the trust
was created by a resident of that state potentially hundreds bf
years earlier.5
The distinction between Resident and non-Resident Trusts is
significant. A Resident Trust, like a resident individual, is
taxed on its entire income from whatever source, whether locat-
ed in the state or not, whether located in the United States or
not. 2 The constitutional basis for such a tax with respect to
resident individuals is well settled.' In contrast, non-resident
individuals and trusts are taxed only on income derived from
sources within the taxing state, such as rental income from real
property located in the state.'M The United States Supreme
Court has held that a state's imposition of an income tax on a
non-resident is constitutional if limited to the non-resident's
source income.5
50. See District of Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d 539, 540-41
(D.C. Cir. 1997). The testator died in 1934; tax liability for 1987-1989 and 1991 was
being disputed by the trustee, Chase Manhattan Bank. Chase was prevented from
disputing its liability for income tax for 1990 on procedural grounds. See id. at 541
n.4.
51. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
52. See HELLERSTEIN & 1hELEIEIN, supra note 40, 20.04[21; see, eg., IL
GEN. LAWS §§ 44-30-12, 44-30-16 (1995 & Supp. 1997).
53. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. 2214, 2222
(1995); New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 312 (1937) (noting that "the
receipt of income by a resident of the territory of a taxing sovereignty is a taxable
event is universally recognized. Domicile itself affords a basis for such taxation. En-
joyment of the privileges of residence in the state and the intended right to invoke
the protection of its laws are inseparable from responsibility for sharing the cost of
governmen"); Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920) (explaining that "as to residents
the state may, and does, exert its taxing power over their income from all sources,
whether within or without the state").
54. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 40, 20.05[2]; see, eg., MISS.
CODE ANN. § 27-7-23(bXl) (1991 & Supp. 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54A. 5-8(1) (West
1986 & Supp. 1997); R.IL GEN. LAWS §§ 44-30-32(bXi), 44-30-35, 44-30-32 (1995).
55. See New York ex rel. Whitney v. Graves, 299 U.S. 366, 372 (1937). In Whit-
176 [Vol. 32:165
STATE TAXATION OF TRUSTS
Therefore, the classification of a trust as a Resident or as a
non-Resident is crucial to determining its state income tax
liability. If a trust holds only intangibles, such as stocks, as a
resident of a particular state, it will owe state income tax on
all of its income. If, however, the trust is not classified as a
resident by any state, then it will wholly escape state income
taxation, since the income from intangibles is, generally, not
source income from any state.
New York, Connecticut and Massachusetts address, directly
in their statutes defining Resident Trusts, or the regulations
thereunder, the issue of the tenuous constitutional basis for the
state income taxation of a trust whose sole connection to the
state is the residence of the settlor/testator. After unsuccessfully
litigating this issue several times," the New York Commission
of Taxation and Finance amended its regulations regarding the
definition of Resident Trusts.57 The amended regulations pro-
vide that no income tax is imposed on a trust if. (1) all the
trustees are domiciled outside of New York, (2) there are no
trust assets located in New York, and (3) the trust has no New
York source income. 8
Connecticut, in apparent recognition of the closer relationship
between testamentary trusts and the state of residence of the
testator,59 provides that the income of an inter vivos "Resident
Trust" is pro-rated based on the proportion of Connecticut resi-
dent non-contingent beneficiaries. No such proration is made for
testamentary trusts.60 Thus, for example, an inter vivos trust
created by a resident of Connecticut with four income benefi-
ciaries, two of which are Connecticut residents, pays income tax
on one half (2/4) of its income to the state of Connecticut.6' If
ney, the United States Supreme Court held that New York may tax a non-resident
on gains received from the sale of a seat on the New York Stock Exchange. See id.
56. See, e.g., Taylor v. New York State Taxation Comm'n, 445 N.Y.S.2d 648 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1981); Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Murphy, 242 N.Y.S.2d 26
(N.Y. App. Div. 1963), qffd, 15 N.Y.S.2d 579 (N.Y. 1964).
57. See Personal Income Tax Reg. § 105.23 (1997).
58. See id.
59. See infra notes 199-210 and accompanying text.
60. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-701(a) (West 1993).
61. See id. § 12-701(a). For tax years prior to January 1, 1993, Connecticut pro-
vided an exemption similar to that provided by New York; namely, no Connecticut
income tax was imposed on a Connecticut Resident Trust if: (1) none of the trustees
were Connecticut residents, (2) no trust property was located in Connecticut, and
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none of the beneficiaries of the trust are Connecticut residents,
the trust would pay no Connecticut income tax.62 In contrast,
Connecticut would impose an income tax on all of the income of
a similarly situated testamentary trust, irrespective of the resi-
dence of the beneficiaries.
Massachusetts provides for a broader definition of Resident
Trusts in that the term includes an inter vivos trust created by
an individual who died a Massachusetts resident, even if the
individual was not a Massachusetts resident at the time of
creation of the trust.s In order to be classified a Massachu-
setts Resident Trust, however, at least one trustee must be a
Massachusetts resident."
While the New York Commission of Taxation apparently
amended its regulations in response to the losses on this issue
it faced in the New York courts, no case addressing this issue
has been litigated in Connecticut. Further, in 1930 the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court suggested, in dicta, that the imposition
of an income tax on a trust based solely on the residence of the
testator is constitutional.' Perhaps the Connecticut and Mas-
sachusetts legislatures' choice to provide for such an exception
before any challenges in the state courts is evidence of their
opinion that taxing a trust, or at least an inter vivos trust,
whose only connection to such state is the residence of the
settlor at the time of the trust's creation, would be either unfair
or constitutionally prohibited, or both.
(3) the trust had no Connecticut source income. See id.
Curiously, the current exception, which is discussed in the main text, is not
necessarily narrower than the previous one. For example, under the current exception,
applicable to tax years beginning after January 1, 1993, inter vivos trusts created by
Connecticut residents are not taxed by Connecticut if none of the income beneficiaries
are Connecticut residents, even if the trustees are Connecticut residents. In contrast,
under the exception applicable to tax years prior to January 1, 1993, such a trust
would be subject to Connecticut income tax. Of course, the exception applicable to
taxable years beginning after January 1, 1993, applies only to inter vivos trusts while
the exception applicable to tax years prior to January 1, 1993, applies to any Resi-
dent Trust, whether testamentary or inter vivos.
62. See id. Since zero of four of the income beneficiaries are Connecticut resi-
dents, the trust pays income tax on 0/4ths of its income to Connecticut.
63. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 62, § 10(c) (Law Co-op. 1990).
64. See id.
65. See Hutchins v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, 172 N.E. 605,
609 (Mass. 1930). The continued validity of Hutchins in light of subsequent United
States Supreme Court cases is questionable. See supra note 23.
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While the Resident/non-Resident Trust taxation system de-
scribed above is the most common, and is, for the most part,
the basis of the issues discussed in this article, it is not the
only system employed. For example, under California law, the
entire income of the trust is taxed by the State of California if
all of the trustees or all of the income beneficiaries are Califor-
nia residents." If some, but not all, of the trustees are Cali-
fornia residents, the California taxable income is apportioned
based on the number of trustees that are residents. 7 If some,
but not all, of the trustees and some, but not all, of the benefi-
ciaries are California residents, then the California taxable
income of the trust is based on a formula that involves both the
proportion of resident trustees and the proportion of resident
beneficiaries." In any event, regardless of the residence of any
of the beneficiaries or any of the trustees, California, like most
states, imposes an income tax on all California source
income. 9 Similarly, Mississippi bases its income taxation of
trusts on the residence of the trustees.7" The United States
Supreme Court has held that the income taxation of a trust
based on the proportion of trustees of the trust that are resi-
dents of the taxing state is constitutional.7
H. SAFE DEPOSIT & TRUST COMPANY OF
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND
The sole Supreme Court case arguably analogous to the issue
of the constitutional limitations on state income taxation of
Resident Trusts, Safe Deposit,72 has been largely ignored by
the state courts that have addressed this issue.73 Safe Deposit
involved an inter vivos trust created by a Virginia resident.
66. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17742 (West 1994).
67. See id. § 17743. Similarly, if some, but not all, of the beneficiaries are Cali-
fornia residents, the California taxable income is apportioned based on the number of
resident beneficiaries. See id. § 17744.
68. See California Franchise Tax Board Legal Ruling, 1959 WL 1349 (Oct. 27,
1959).
69. See CAL REV. & TAX. CODE § 17041(b) (West 1994).
70. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-7-27 (1991); Taxpayers and Rates [Miss.], State Tax
Guide (CCI) 15-561 (Nov. 1996).
71. See Greenough v. Tax Assessors, 331 U.S. 486, 486 (1947).
72. 280 U.S. 83 (1929).
73. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
1998]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
After the settlor's death, the sole trustee of the trust, the Safe
Deposit & Trust Company of Baltimore, was a Maryland resi-
dent. The beneficiaries were residents of Virginia; however, the
trustee was directed to accumulate, rather than distribute, trust
income until the beneficiaries attained twenty-five years of age.
Virginia imposed an ad valorem' tax on the entire corpus of
the trust based on the residence of the beneficiaries. The Su-
preme Court held that Virginia was constitutionally prohibited
from taxing the trust because "nobody within Virginia has [a]
present right to ... control or possession, [of the trusts' assets]
or to receive income therefrom, or to cause them to be brought
physically within" Virginia.75 The Court rejected application of
the doctrine mobilia sequuntur personam, a maxim that implies
that the movables held by the trust were in Virginia for tax
purposes, because they "followed" the beneficiaries who held the
beneficial interests.7"
The decision in Safe Deposit is based largely on the risk of
double taxation. The Court noted that the securities held by the
trust were taxable in the State of Maryland, where they were
located.77 Since the stocks were taxable in Maryland, the Court
held that they could not also be taxed in Virginia.7" The Court
stated that "[t]he adoption of a contrary rule would involve
possibilities of an extremely serious character by permitting
double taxation both unjust and oppressive."7 Thus, the hold-
ing of Safe Deposit was predicated on the fact that a contrary
74. See supra note 34.
75. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83, 91 (1929). None of the
state courts that have addressed the issue of the constitutional limitations on the
state taxation of Resident Trusts have confronted a Resident Trust with income bene-
ficiaries that are residents of the same state as the trust. The tenor of these deci-
sions, however, indicates that these courts would hold this connection to be a suffi-
cient nexus for taxation. Moreover, in Swift v. Director of Revenue, 727 S.W.2d 880
(Mo. 1987), the court created a six-part test, which is discussed infra, to determine
the constitutionality of a state's taxation of a trust. See i&L at 882; see also infra
notes 185-98 and accompanying text. The trust at issue in Safe Deposit meets three
of the six Swift factors, which should be sufficient to constitutionally justify state
taxation. See Swift, 727 S.W.2d at 882.
76. See Safe Deposit, 280 U.S. at 92. Mobilia sequuntur personam literally means
that movables follow the person. See BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY 1003 (6th ed. 1990).
77. See Safe Deposit, 280 U.S. at 91.
78. See id. at 92.
79. Id. at 93.
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rule could lead to taxation of the entire corpus of the trust by
both Virginia and Maryland.
Justice Holmes, in dissent, argued that double taxation is not
constitutionally prohibited.0 The dissent agreed that the secu-
rities were taxable by Maryland, but reasoned that that did not
limit the right of Virginia to also tax the securities."'
Justice Holmes' dissent was prophetic. In cases decided sub-
sequent to Safe Deposit, the Supreme Court held that double
taxation is not constitutionally prohibited. For example, in Cur-
ry v. McCanless,"2 the Supreme Court held that both Tennes-
see and Alabama may impose an estate tax on the same es-
tate.' Thus, the constitutional prohibition against double tax-
ation, which was the intellectual underpinning of the Court's
decision in Safe Deposit, has been undermined by Cuny and
other cases that hold that double taxation is not constitution-
ally prohibited. Therefore, if a fact pattern similar to that of
Safe Deposit were to come before the Supreme Court today, it
is doubtful that the Court would follow the analysis of Safe
Deposit without analyzing the underlying issues under the con-
stitutional theories established by the more recent cases. De-
spite the fact that the intellectual basis of Safe Deposit has
80. See id. at 96-97 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
81. See id. Justice Holmes explained,
I am of opinion that on principle [the trust corpus] can be taxed [by
Virginia]. In the first place I do not think that it matters that the own-
ers, residing in Virginia, have only an equitable title. To be sure the
trustee having the legal title and possession of the bonds in Maryland
may be taxed there. But that does not affect the right of Virginia by
reason of anything that I know of in the Constitution of the United
States.
Id.
82. 307 U.S. 357 (1939).
83. See id. at 368; see also Paul J. Hartman, Constitutional Limitations on State
Taxation of Corporate Income from Multinational Corporations, 37 VAND. L. REV. 217,
267 (1984).
Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982), is similar in result to Curry. In Cory, both
Texas and California asserted that Howard Hughes was a resident of their respective
states at the time of his death. Thus, both states imposed an estate tax on Mr.
Hughes' estate. The Supreme Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to settle the dis-
pute, but the action was barred by the Eleventh Amendment; thus, the estate was
subject to state estate taxation by both California and Texas. See id. at 91. For a de-
tailed discussion of Cory, see Kathleen Leslie Roing, Due Process Limits on State
Estate Taxation: An Analogy to the State Corporate Income Tax, 94 YALE L.J. 1229
(1985).
1998] 181
182 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:165
been undermined by more recent Supreme Court precedents, it
has never been expressly overruled.
Despite the weakened authority of Safe Deposit, it seems any
court addressing the issue of the constitutional limitations on
the state taxation of trusts would, at the very least, discuss the
case, since it remains part of the very scant Supreme Court
precedent that directly involves the constitutionality of state
taxation of trusts. Despite this fact, however, several of the
cases that have addressed this issue have disregarded Safe
Deposit without so much as a citation."
A court addressing the constitutionality of state income tam-
tion of a trust based solely on the residence of the set-
tior/testator may distinguish Safe Deposit on its facts; for exam-
ple, Safe Deposit involved an ad valorem tax rather than a
state income tax. This would be a particularly reasonable ap-
proach since the holding of Safe Deposit has been undermined
by subsequent Supreme Court decisions. It seems, however,
that Safe Deposit should be distinguished explicitly, with due
regard given to the Supreme Court's decision and analysis of
the distinctions. This is especially true considering the Supreme
Court's admonition to the lower courts that, rather than try to
anticipate whether or not Supreme Court precedent is still good
law, the lower court should follow the precedent and leave it to
the Supreme Court to overrule its own decisions."
Messrs. Hellerstein and Hellerstein, distinguished commenta-
tors in the area of state taxation, have argued that the cases
that hold that a state may not tax a trust based solely on the
residence of the settlor/testator at the time of the creation of
the trust have so held based on erroneous reliance on Safe De-
posit Trust." Certainly, some of the cases that have decided
84. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d 539 (D.C.
Cir. 1997); Blue v. Department of the Treasury, 462 N.W.2d 762 (Mich. Ct. App.
1990); Westfall v. Director of Revenue, 812 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. 1991); Potter v. Taxa-
tion Div. Dir., 5 N.J. Tax 399 (1983).
85. See Rodriguez de Ouijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
484 (1989) ("If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears
to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, [the lower court] should
follow the case which directly controls, leaving to [the Supreme Court] the prerogative
of overruling its own decisions.").
86. See HELLmPSMIN & HnEimSMIN, supra note 40, q 20.09[2].
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this issue cite Safe Deposit; however, an analysis of these cases
shows that many of these courts are not basing their decisions
on Safe Deposit in any substantial fashion.87 Moreover, as dis-
cussed above, some of the cases that have addressed this issue
have not even cited Safe Deposit. Thus, the argument that
these courts' decisions are based on erroneous reliance on Safe
Deposit seems flawed.s"
The conclusion to the analysis of Safe Deposit is multi-facet-
ed. On the one hand, it is apparent that the analysis in Safe
Deposit has been undermined by subsequent Supreme Court
precedent. This is not to say that the Supreme Court could not
today reach the same decision; however, the Court is unlikely
to do so without analyzing the facts under more recent Su-
preme Court precedent. On the other hand, some of the state
courts, which have dismissed Safe Deposit without so much as
a citation, have not given the 1929 Supreme Court decision its
due regard.89
Based on the above analysis, this article deals with Safe
Deposit as the state courts should have dealt with it when ad-
dressing the constitutional limitations on the state taxation of
Resident Trusts. Namely, after analyzing Safe Deposit, it is
recognized that the underpinnings of the decision have been
overruled by later Supreme Court precedent. Therefore, hav-
ing dealt with Safe Deposit, and determined it not to be control-
ling (a court could distinguish it on the facts), more recent
87. See, e.g., Swift v. Director of Revenue, 727 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Mo. 1987) (citing
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83 (1929); Miller Bros. Co. v. Mary-
land, 347 U.S. 340 (1954)). Safe Deposit and Miller Bros. Co. are cited to support the
well-settled proposition that a state may not tax an entity unless it has "sufficient
connections with the entity to provide a basis for the states' authority to tax." See
Swift, 727 S.W.2d at 882; see also Pennoyer v. Taxation Div. Dir., 5 N.J. Tax 386,
396 (1983) (arguing that Safe Deposit has not been weakened to the extent that it
supports the proposition that "a state may not impose a tax beyond its borders").
88. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
90. Of course, Safe Deposit, and numerous other Supreme Court cases, support
the well settled proposition that a state may not constitutionally tax an entity unless
there is a nexus between the state and the activity sought to be taxed. The ultimate
holding of Safe Deposit, that Virginia may not tax an inter vivos trust created by a
Virginia resident, even though all trust beneficiaries reside in Virginia, must not,
however, be accepted without review of the more recent Supreme Court precedents
regarding the constitutional limitations on state taxation. See Safe Deposit, 280 U.S.
at 61; Miller Bros. Co., 347 U.S. at 342.
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precedent will be analyzed to determine the constitutional limi-
tations on the state taxation of a trust when the sole connec-
tion between the trust and the state is the residence of the set-
tior/testator at the time of creation of the trust.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE AND SUPREME
COURT PRECEDENT
The power of a state to tax is subject to limitation by the
United States Constitution on numerous constitutional theories:
due process, commerce clause, equal protection, privileges and
immunities, intergovernmental immunity, and the prohibition of
state taxation of Native Americans.9 The most significant of
these limitations, however, are the limitations imposed by the
due process and commerce clauses," and this article is mainly
concerned with the limitations imposed by these two clauses. A
state income tax on a trust could certainly be held invalid on
another constitutional theory.93 While these other constitution-
al theories impose meaningful limitations on the power of a
state to tax the income of a trust, they do not impose addition-
al limitations on the subject that is the concern of this article,
since they do not effect the required nexus between an entity
sought to be taxed and the potentially taxing state."
A state tax is evaluated for repugnance to the commerce
clause based on the four part test established in the 1977 Su-
preme Court case Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady.95 In
order not to run afoul of the commerce clause, the taxing state
must show, first, that the tax is applied to an activity with a
"substantial nexus" to the taxing state. Second, the tax must be
fairly apportioned to the activities carried on in the taxing
91. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JoHN E. NowAK, TRFATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 13.1 (1992).
92. See id. For the most part, the due process and the commerce clauses are the
most common constitutional bases for the invalidation of a state tax.
93. For example, a state law that imposed a higher rate of tax on a trust if the
trustees were not residents of the taxing state could be invalid under the privileges
and immunities clause regardless of the connection, or "nexus," between the trust and
the taxing state. See id. § 13.4(aX2).
94. See Seth Goldstein, Resident Taxpayers: Internal Consistency, Due Process, and
State Income Taxation, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 125-127 (1991).
95. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
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state. Third, the tax may not discriminate against interstate
commerce. Fourth, the tax must be fairly related to the services
or benefits provided by the state."
Under the Complete Auto test, for example, a state may tax a
proportional share of the income derived from a "unitary busi-
ness" conducted partially in the taxing state.97 Thus, Vermont
may tax a proportionate share of the world-wide income derived
from Mobil Oil Corporation's unitary business of selling petro-
leum products based on Mobil's sale of petroleum in Ver-
mont.98 Such a tax, however, must be both internally and ex-
ternally consistent.99 A tax is internally consistent if the ap-
portionment formula employed by the state is such that if an
identical formula was employed by every jurisdiction, no more
than all of the income of the unitary business would be taxed.
A tax is externally consistent if it accurately reflects a reason-
able sense of how the income in the unitary business is actually
generated.' 0
The due process clause places two closely related restrictions
on a state's power to tax. First, there must be a "minimal con-
nection" between the activities sought to be taxed and the tax-
ing state. Second, the income attributed to the state for tax
purposes must be "rationally related" to the values connected
with the taxing state.10 1
96. See id. at 279; Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992).
97. See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 772 (1992).
98. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
The method of apportionment, or the apportionment formula, has been the sub-
ject of substantial constitutional debate. See, e.g., Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise
Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 164 (1983) ("We have long held that the Constitution impos-
es no single [apportionment] formula on the [states ... ."); Norfolk and W. Ry. Co.
v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317 (1968) (invalidating a tax on a railroad
based on the proportion of miles of track located in Missouri); Moorman Mfg. Co. v.
G.D. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978) (upholding a single factor apportionment formula
based on gross sales). The various constitutional methods of apportionment are not,
however, relevant to the topics discussed in this article. See generally Paul J.
Hartman, Constitutional Limitations on State Taxation of Corporate Income from Mul-
tinational Corporations, 37 VAND. L REV. 217 (1984).
99. See Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 169.
100. See id.
101. See Moorman Mfg., 437 U.S. at 272-73.
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The 1992 Supreme Court case, Quill Corp. v. North Dako-
ta,10 2 discussed the limitations imposed by the due process
and commerce clauses. Quill involved facts that are quite simi-
lar to National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue,"es
which was decided by the Supreme Court in 1967 and partially
overruled by Quill. In Quill, the Supreme Court was faced with
a taxpayer, Quill Corporation, that was a mail order house
incorporated in Delaware. No Quill employees worked in North
Dakota or were residents of North Dakota, and Quill owned no
property in North Dakota. Quill delivered merchandise ordered
by North Dakota residents via U.S. mail or common carrier.'
North Dakota imposed a use tax on merchandise sold by Quill
to North Dakota residents. 5 Quill Corporation challenged the
tax on both due process and commerce clause grounds.
Prior to Quill, it had been noted by courts, including the
National Bellas Hess Court, and commentators that the require-
ments of the due process clause were essentially coextensive
with the first and fourth prongs of the four-part Complete Auto
test. °6 Quill, however, distinguished between the "minimum
contacts" requirement of the due process clause and the nexus
requirements of the commerce clause."0 The Quill Court rea-
soned that the due process clause concerns the fundamental
fairness of governmental activity; thus, the relevant issues are
"notice" and "fair warning." 8 In contrast, the nexus re-
102. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
103. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
104. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 301.
105. A use tax is, essentially, a sales tax that is collected by merchants that are
non-residents of the taxing state. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1543 (6th ed. 1990). If
a state is unable to collect the use tax from the merchant, the liability for the tax
frequently falls upon the resident customer. It has been noted, however, that compli-
ance with this tax by residents is quite low;, thus, as a practical matter, a state is
unlikely to collect its use tax unless the state can make the collection directly from
the merchant. See Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 343 (1954) (The col-
lection of the use tax from inhabitants is a difficult administrative problem . ..);
Michael T. Fatale, Geoffrey Sidesteps Quill: Constitutional Nexus, Intangible Property
and the State Taxation of Income, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 407, 409-10 n.13 (1994).
106. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 305 ("[AlIthough we have not always been precise
in distinguishing between the two, the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause
are analytically distinct."); National Bells Hess, 386 U.S. at 756; Miller Bros. Co.,
347 U.S. at 344-45 (applying the same standard under the due process and commerce
clause); ROTUNDA & NOWAi, supra note 91, § 13.4(a); Goldstein, supra note 94, at
127-28.
107. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 305.
108. See id. at 312; Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768,
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quirement of the Complete Auto test is concerned with the ef-
fects of state taxation on interstate commerce. 9
In Quill, the Court equated the due process requirements for
a valid state tax with the due process requirements for state
jurisdiction under International Shoe.n" Thus, a state tax
would not be held invalid under the due process clause provid-
ed that there exists "minimum contacts" between the taxpayer
and the state. By adopting the International Shoe standard, the
Supreme Court rejected a "formalistic" approach to its due
process jurisprudence."' Thus, while physical presence would
be probative of a taxpayer's "minimum contacts" with a state, is
not a necessary requirement to a state's power to impose a
valid tax under the due process clause."
The Quill Court held that Quill Corporation had "purposeful-
ly directed" its activities towards the residents of North Dakota.
Thus, the Court held that North Dakota may impose a use tax
on Quill Corporation unhindered by the due process clause of
the United States Constitution. Regarding the fact that Quill
Corporation had no physical presence in North Dakota, the
Court noted that "it matters little that such solicitation is ac-
complished by a deluge of catalogues rather than a phalanx of
drummers: [t]he requirements of due process are met irrespec-
tive of a corporation's lack of physical presence in the taxing
[s]tate." Thus, the Supreme Court partially overruled Na-
tional Bellas Hess which had required physical presence of a
777-78 (1992). (MIhe reason the commerce clause includes this limit is self-evident: In
a Union of 50 states, to permit each State to tax activities outside its borders would
have drastic consequences for the national economy, as businesses could be subjected
to severe multiple taxation.").
109. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 311. As the Supreme Court noted in Quill, the
purpose of the commerce clause was to prevent the state taxes and duties that hin-
dered interstate commerce under the Articles of Confederation government. See id.
110. See id. at 307.
111. See id. at 306-07.
112. See id. at 307-08 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462
(1985)).
Similarly, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), held
that physical presence was not necessary for a state court to exercise jurisdiction. In
so doing, International Shoe greatly limited Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877),
which had required physical presence for personal jurisdiction. Pennoyer was explicitly
overruled in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
113. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 308.
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taxpayer in the taxing state under the due process and com-
merce clauses. 4
A divided Supreme Court affirmed the commerce clause hold-
ing of National Bellas Hess. The majority admitted that the
physical presence requirement of National Bellas Hess is not
wholly consistent with the Court's more recent commerce clause
jurisprudence; however, the Court argued that this did not
imply repudiation of the National Bellas Hess commerce clause
rule. The Quill Court noted that the first and fourth prongs of
the Complete Auto commerce clause test, which require a "sub-
stantial nexus" and a "relationship between the tax and state-
provided services," are intended to limit the reach of the taxing
state in order to ensure that state taxation does not overly
burden interstate commerce." 5 In contrast, the due process
"minimum contacts" requirement is more accurately conceptual-
ized as a "proxy for notice.""' Based on this distinction, the
Quill Court reaffirmed the physical presence requirement of the
commerce clause holding of National Bellas Hess. The Court
noted, however, that this holding is limited to the context of
sales and use taxes. Moreover, the Court's holding was partially
based on the fear that a contrary ruling would upset reliance
by mail order businesses on their exemption from state sale
and use taxes."'
The Quill Court recognized that the bright-line commerce
clause test of National Bellas Hess, which they had reaffirmed,
like other bright-line tests, "appears artificial at its edges.""'
The Court noted that the constitutional authority of a state to
collect a sales or use tax from a vendor may turn on the pres-
ence of a small sales force, plant, or office in the potentially
taxing state. The artificiality of this rule, the Court reasoned,
was more than offset by the benefit of clearly established
boundaries regarding sales and use taxes. Thus, the issue of
the constitutional limits regarding state sales and use taxes
114. See id.
115. See id. at 313.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 316-18. The dissent, in contrast, questioned how any party could
reasonably rely on an ability to conduct affairs without being taxed. See id. at 331-32
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
118. Id. at 315.
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would be protected from the "quagmire" of constitutional limita-
tions on other state taxes. 9
Therefore, North Dakota was prevented from collecting its
use tax from Quill Corporation by the commerce, but not the
due process, clause. The Court noted that since taxation was
prevented solely by the dormant commerce clause, Congress
could permit such taxation by statute."
Justice White dissented from the majority's holding regarding
the commerce clause and argued that the commerce clause
holding of National Bellas Hess was inconsistent with the
Court's more recent commerce clause precedents and should be
overruled. Justice White also argued that the distinction, drawn
by the majority, between the nexus requirements of the due
process and commerce clauses was not supported by the lan-
guage of the requirements or their derivation."2
Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas agreed with the majori-
ty that the commerce clause holding of National Bellas Hess
should not be overruled. They argued, however, that the ma-
jority should not have revisited the merits of the issue, but
instead, should have adhered to that principle merely on the
basis of stare decisis.'"
119. See id. at 315 (noting "[ojur law in this area is something of a 'quagmire' and
the 'application of constitutional principles to specific state statutes leaves much room
for controversy and confusion and little in the way of precise guides to the States in
the exercise of their indispensable power of taxation") (citing Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1959)).
The dissent, in contrast, warned of the deluge of litigation that the physical
presence standard imposed by the majority was likely to cause. See id. at 331 (White,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The concurrence, however, noted that
the physical presence requirement, which had been in place since National Bellas
Hess, has not previously led to such a "flurry of litigation." Id. at 321 (Scalia, Kenne-
dy and Thomas, J.J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
120. See id. at 318.
121. See id. at 325-327 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
122. See id. at 320 (Scalia, Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and con-
curring in judgment).
The views of Justices Thomas, Scalia and Rehnquist regarding the commerce
clause have recently come under attack based on their purported lack of regard for
stare decisis when, in a recent dissent penned by Justice Thomas, they argued that
the entire line of Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the dormant commerce
clause should be overruled and that an 1868 case limiting the Import-Export clause
should also be overruled so that the Export-Import clause may partially replace the
dormant commerce clause. See Camps NewfoundlOwatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison,
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The ramifications of the Quill commerce clause holding for
state income taxation of a trust with little connection to the
potentially taxing state are unclear. Quill was an attempt to
retain a straight-forward "bright-line" test regarding the com-
merce clause limitations on a state's power to tax; however, the
Quill Court expressly limited its holding to sales and use tax-
es.' Moreover, even if a court were to apply the physical
presence requirement of Quill to a state's income taxation of a
trust with minimal connections to that state, it is difficult to
see how such a physical presence requirement would be ap-
plied. As will be discussed infra,"2 a trust is something of a
hybrid between an entity and a mere relationship. Thus, it is
difficult to determine where, if anywhere, a trust can be said to
have a physical presence, although, clearly, the residence of the
trustees, the beneficiaries, the settlor/testator or the location of
trust assets are all possibilities.
Due to the unclear implications of Quill, in order to deter-
mine the constitutionality of a state's income taxation of a trust
where the sole connection between it and the potentially taxing
state is the residence of the settlor/testator at the time of the
creation of a trust, one must delve into the "quagmire" of the
constitutional limitations on state taxation warned of in
Quill.'
Maine, 117 S. Ct. 1590, 1615 (1997) (Thomas, Scalia, JJ., Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
("That the expansion effected by today's decision finds some support in the morass of
our negative Commerce Clause case law only serves to highlight the need to abandon
that failed jurisprudence and to consider restoring the original Import-Export clause
check on discriminatory state taxation to what appears to be its proper role."). The
portion of the dissent that proposed overruling Woodruff v. Parhan, 75 U.S. 123
(1869), was not joined by Justice Rebnquist. See also Richard D. Friedman, Judicial
Activism Saves Us From Bad Law; Time to Clean House, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1997,
at A24; Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; Beware, Judicial Activist!, N.Y. TIMES, June
2, 1997, at A15.
123. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 317-18.
124. See infra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
125. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 315; see also Northwestern States Portland Ce-
ment Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457 (1959) ("That there is a 'need for clearing
up the tangled underbrush of past cases' with reference to the taxing power of the
States is a concomitant to the negative approach resulting from a case-by-case resolu-
tion of the 'extremely limited restrictions that the Constitution places upon the
states.... .).
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V. TRUSTS WITH LITTLE CONNECTION TO THE TAXING STATE
Several state courts have addressed the issue of the constitu-
tionality of income taxation of a trust by a state whose only
connection to the trust is the residence of settlor/testator at the
time of the creation of the trust. Of these cases, the decided
weight of authority is that the imposition of such an income tax
is constitutionally prohibited.' Only one of these cases, Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank,' was decided
subsequent to Quill. In this 1997 case, which is the sole case to
find such a tax constitutional, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the District
may tax such a trust and suggested that the earlier contrary
cases were overruled by Quill.'
Chase involved the imposition of an income tax by the Dis-
trict of Columbia on a testamentary trust created under the
will of a District resident.' The tax was challenged by the
trustee, Chase Manhattan Bank, on due process grounds, but
not commerce clause grounds. As the District of Columbia noted
in its brief, the tax could not be invalidated on commerce
clause grounds since the commerce clause does not restrict the
power of Congress, even when legislating merely for the District
of Columbia.'
126. See, e.g., Blue v. Department of the Treasury, 462 N.W.2d 762 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1990); Westfall v. Director of Revenue, 812 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. 1991); Swift v.
Director of Revenue, 727 S.W.2d 880 (Mo. 1987); Pennoyer v. Taxation Div. Dir., 5
N.J. Tax 386 (1983); Potter v. Taxation Div. Dir., 5 N.J. Tax 399 (1983); Taylor v.
New York State Taxation Comm'n, 445 N.Y.S.2d 648 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); see also
Virginia Department of Taxation Letter Ruling, 1993 WL 372991 (Aug. 26, 1993).
127. 689 A.2d 539 (D.C. Ct App. 1997).
128. See id. at 545. As previously discussed, in Hutchins v. Commissioner of Cor-
porations and Taxation, 172 N.E. 605 (Mass. 1930), the Massachusetts Supreme Court
suggested, in dicta, that taxation based solely on the residence of the testator was
constitutionally acceptable. See Hutchins, 172 N.E. at 609-10. As mentioned, however,
Hutchins has likely been overruled by subsequent United States Supreme Court pre-
cedents. See supra note 23.
129. See Chase Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d at 539.
130. See Brief for the District of Columbia at 12 n.6, District of Columbia v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d 539 (D.C. Ct. App. 1997) (No. 95-TX-1599).
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A. Due Process Clause
Turning first to the due process clause, the issue is largely
reduced to whether there are "minimum contacts" between the
trust and the potentially taxing state. 131 The difficult issue,
however, is whether any of the numerous possible connections
between the potentially taxing state and the trust are constitu-
tionally sufficient. The various state courts that have addressed
the issue, for the most part, have held these connections inad-
equate to sustain the constitutionality of the tax."sc As noted,
however, these cases were decided prior to Quill.
1. Jurisdiction of the State Courts and Periodic Accountings
One of the most significant connections between a trust and
the state of residence of the settlor/testator is that the state
courts will assert jurisdiction over the trust."sc The availabili-
ty of the state courts, even if it is never utilized by the trust, is
a benefit that the trust has received from the potentially taxing
state. Tested against the "simple but controlling question" de-
scribed by the Supreme Court in J.C. Penney Co. of whether
the state has given anything "for which it can ask return,""8
this benefit may be sufficient to constitutionally justify the tax.
There are numerous states that may assert jurisdiction over
a trust. For example, the New York courts assert jurisdiction
over an inter vivos trust if. (1) the trust was created by a New
131. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1992); Miller Bros. Co.
v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954).
132. See supra note 128 and accompanying text
133. See WLLIAM F. FRATCHER, SCOTT ON TRUSTS §§ 566-67 (4th ed. 1989); see,
e.g., CAL PROB. CODE § 17300 (West 1991); N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 207
(McKinney, Consol. & Gould 1997).
134. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940) ("The test is whether
property was taken without due process of law, or, if paraphrase we must, whether
the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal relation to protection, opportunities
and benefits given by the state. The simple but controlling question is whether the
state has given anything for which it can ask return."). The attempt by the J.C.
Penney Co. Court to reduce the issue into the one "simple but controlling question"
has been called by some commentators a "sweeping oversimplification" of the due
process limitations on a state's power to tax. See HELLERSTEIN & HmE IN, supra
note 40, T 6.03.
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York resident, (2) an acting trustee resides in New York, or
(3) if any trust assets are located in New York." Thus, ' for
example, based on the argument that the availability of the
state courts allows the imposition of an income tax on the en-
tire income of a trust, a trust whose sole connection to New
York is the location of minimal property in the state may be
subject to income tax on all of its income by New York for that
reason. While such a tax intuitively seems to be a constitution-
al anathema, this result is merely the obvious outcome of the
argument that the availability of the state courts provides a
sufficient basis for the jurisdiction to tax. On the other hand,
even this result may not be constitutionally prohibited. Under
the due process clause, the requirement is "minimum con-
tacts.""3 This connection has been found where a mail order
house mails catalogues into the taxing state or, in the in perso-
nam jurisdiction context, where a nonresident is served with
process while passing through the state."s Thus, due to the
relatively low standard, perhaps the availability of the courts is
a sufficient contact. A conclusion that a state tax on the entire
income of a trust is constitutional based on the jurisdiction of
the state courts, which in turn may be based on the presence of
even minor property in the state," may, however, be viewed
as contradicting the Supreme Court's holding that a non-Resi-
dent may be taxed only on source income from the taxing
state.1 39
In Chase, Chase Manhattan Bank, as trustee, argued that
the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia courts (and their
review of accountings) was not a sufficient nexus to justify the
imposition of the income tax by the District since, in order to
avail itself of the jurisdiction of the state courts, Chase was
obligated to pay court fees.' 4 These fees, Chase argued, com-
135. See N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 207; see also FRATCHER, supra note 133, §§
570-71.
136. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 306; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
137. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 305-09; Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495
U.S. 604 (1990).
138. See N.Y. SU. CT. PRoc. AT § 207.
139. See New York ex rel. Whitney v. Graves, 299 U.S. 366 (1937).
140. See Brief for Chemical Bank (a/k/a Chase Manhattan Bank), Trustee of the
Esther L. Guth Trust at 30 n.20, District of Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 689
A.2d 539, 543 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ('he trustee also maintains that whatever bene-
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pensated the District for use of its courts. Thus, the District
courts had not given anything for which they could ask an
additional return in the guise of an income tax. This argument
has some intuitive appeal. It is, however, contrary to estab-
lished tenets of the constitutional limitations on taxation.
There is no constitutional requirement that the amount a
state may exact from an entity by way of a tax must be reason-
able compensation to the state for the value of the services it
has provided.141 If this were so, a state would be required to
prove that it provided proportionately greater services to a
wealthy individual, who will presumably pay higher taxes, than
a less wealthy individual.
Further, since state income tax rates are generally progres-
sive, not only would the state have to show that it provided
services of greater value to its wealthy residents, but the
amount of the additional services would have to be progressive.
That is, an individual who earns twice as much as another
individual would need to receive more than two times the value
of services than the poorer individual. Moreover, this "quid pro
quo" argument put forth by Chase seems inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's holding that a resident may be taxed on all of
its income by its state of residence. There is no indication in
these cases that a resident may only be taxed up to the value
of the services it received from the state of residence. 142
Some jurisdictions require that the trustees of a trust created
by one of their residents submit periodic accountings to their
courts.1" Presumably, this is for the purpose of allowing the
court to monitor both the trust and the trustees in an ongoing
fashion. It has been argued that these periodic accountings
provide a sufficient nexus for the imposition of income tax on
fits have accrued to the trust from the accountings have already been paid for in the
form of court fees. This argument misses the point.... ").
141. See Chase Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d at 543 n.8.
142. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. 2214, 2222
(1995); New York ex reL. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937).
143. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-177 (West 1993); D.C. R. Civ. P. 305
(1997).
An accounting or the trustee's "account" is a financial summary of the trust's
activities, including investments and distributions. See generally CAL PROB. CODE
§ 10900 (West 1991); ROBERT A. HENDRICKSON & JOSEPH A. ROTELLA, ESTATE AND
TRusT ACCOUNTING, LASSER ETATE TAx TECHNIQUES § 48.03 (1994).
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the trust.1' A state court's periodic review of accountings pre-
pared by the trustees is, arguably, a benefit provided by the
state. If the issue is reduced to the inquiry, described in J.C.
Penney Co., of whether "the state has given anything for which
it can ask return,'4 it seems that periodic accountings, like
the continuing jurisdiction of the state courts, may be sufficient
to constitutionally justify the tax. On the other hand, the re-
quirement of periodic accountings may be viewed, with equal
validity, as a rather insignificant benefit bestowed upon the
trust. In fact, since the trust must pay the necessary legal and
court fees in order to prepare and submit these accountings,
they may be viewed as more of a burden than a benefit. In this
case, permitting the state to use the requirement of periodic
accountings as a "hook" to collect the income tax allows a state
to constitutionally justify the imposition of an income tax by
imposing an additional burden on the trust.
The availability of the state courts and the periodic
accountings that may be required are possible "minimum con-
nections" between a trust and a state that may justify the im-
position of the income tax. These possible connections, however,
arise out of the initial event that is, by state statute, the basis
for the imposition of the income tax; that is, the creation of the
trust by a resident of the state. The residence of the set-
tlor/testator at the time of the creation of the trust engenders
three events, namely: (1) the classification of the trust as a
Resident Trust (and the concomitant state income tax liabili-
ties); (2) the continuing jurisdiction of the state courts; and (3)
the periodic accountings that may be required. Evaluating the
constitutionality of the tax based on the latter two events al-
lows the state to constitutionally justify an income tax by the
same "constitutionally suspect" classification that is the basis of
the tax; namely, the residence of the settlor/testator at the time
of the creation of the trust.' Such analysis would allow the
constitutionality of a tax imposed based on the residence of the
settlor/testator at the time of creation of the trust to turn on
144. See Brief for the District of Columbia at 6, Chase Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d
at 6.
145. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
146. See Blue v. Department of the Treasury, 462 N.W.2d 762, 764 (Mich. Ct. App.
1990).
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connections that are imposed, by statute, based on the resi-
dence of the settlor/testator at the time of the creation of the
trust. This analysis is circular in its reasoning.
To use an extreme example: suppose a state were to classify
all trusts created by blonds as Residential Trusts and tax all
Resident Trusts on all trust income wherever earned. The
state's probate laws similarly provide that all trusts created by
blonds are subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the state
courts and the trustees must submit annual accountings to the
state courts. One would not analyze the constitutionality of
such a taxation system based on the continuing jurisdiction of
state courts and the requirement of periodic accountings; rath-
er, one would seek to analyze the constitutionality of the under-
lying classification, namely that those trusts that are created by
blonds are Resident Trusts. Similarly, the issue at hand must
be analyzed in terms of the basis for taxation as provided in
the statute, namely the residence of the settlor/testator.
2. Residence of the Settlor/Testator
The residence of the settlor/testator at the time of the cre-
ation of the trust is, clearly, a significant connection between
the trust and the state. Even courts that have found that this
connection does not by itself constitutionally justify state in-
come taxation, have admitted the significance of this relation-
ship.4" It has been noted that a trust "owes its very exis-
tence" to the law of the state of residence of the
settlor/testator.'" The state, through its system of laws, has
created an environment in which the settlor/testator may create
the trust. Moreover, even if the law of that state does not gov-
ern the trust, it is likely that the transfer of the assets to the
147. See, e.g., Swift v. Director of Revenue, 727 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Mo. 1987). Swift
established a six-factor test for the constitutionality of state income taxation of a
trust, which is discussed infra. The state of residence of the settlor/testator at the
time of the creation of the trust meets the first two factors. See infra notes 185-98
and accompanying text.
Applying the Swift test, a trust created by a resident of the state of Missouri
may be constitutionally taxed on all of its income by the state of Missouri based on
the fact that a minor trust asset is located in Missouri. See Westfall v. Director of
Revenue, 812 S.W.2d 513, 514 (Mo. 1991).
148. See Chase Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d at 543.
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trust was a conveyance subject to the laws of the residence of
the settlor/testator. It is the laws of the settlor/testator's resi-
dential state that have allowed her to accumulate wealth in
order to transfer it to the trust. The trust, to a large extent,
seems to owe its existence to the munificent laws of the state of
residence of the testator/settlor. These relationships seem pow-
erful evidence of "minimum contacts" between the state and the
trust that should allow the state to constitutionally impose an
income tax on the trust.
149
On the other hand, all of these connections potentially oc-
curred some time ago. The issue, thus, becomes whether a con-
stitutionally sufficient nexus between a state and a trust may
be a nexus that arose in the recent or distant past. Drawing
from the language of J.C. Penney Co., if the issue is usually
whether the state has given anything for which it can ask re-
turn, the issue now becomes: if a state once gave something for
which it could have asked return, may the state continue to ask
return indefinitely?"5 Unsurprisingly, the answer is unclear.
For example, suppose a resident of a potentially taxing state
dies leaving an estate that becomes the subject of lengthy and
expensive litigation in the probate courts of the state. The out-
come of this litigation is that a testamentary trust is funded
with the estate assets. The trustee, however, is not a resident
of the state nor are the beneficiaries. Is there a significant
enough relationship between this trust and the state to justify
income taxation by the state for the entire existence of the
trust? If not, when does the trust stop being subject to income
taxation by the state? The day the trust is funded, the day
after, or some period of time after that when the relationship
that is the basis for the tax, and the purported constitutional
nexus, "wears off'? Moreover, if the trust was the subject of
continuing litigation in the state's probate courts, would that
provide sufficient nexus for the imposition of the income tax in
these later years?151
149. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307 (1992).
150. See J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. at 444.
151. As discussed supra, the state's probate court would assert jurisdiction over the
trust based on the residence of the testator. See supra notes 133-39 and accompa-
nying text.
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In the above described situation, the relationship between the
trust and the state is quite close. It seems that there are "mini-
mum contacts" between the trust and the state as required by
Quill and International Shoe. In this example, allowing the
trust to escape paying the state income tax is, arguably, inequi-
table. This is a trust that has, and possibly is, frequently taken
advantage of benefits provided by the state. The trust has been
the subject of litigation and is benefiting from the state courts
and the legal structure they provide. Therefore, intuitively, it
seems that the relationship between such a trust and the po-
tentially taxing state is close enough to constitutionally justify
the tax.
Does this analysis change over time? For example, suppose
that the trust described above is a dynasty trust.152 Assume
further that fifty years after creation of the trust, no trust
assets nor beneficiaries nor trustees are located in, or are resi-
dents of, the potentially taxing state, nor have any of them
been such for the last fifty years. In that fifty-year period, the
trustees have not once availed themselves of the courts of the
potentially taxing state, although they may have conducted
proceedings in the courts of other states. Can the state consti-
tutionally tax the trust when the "minimum connection" be-
tween the trust and the state is an event that occurred half a
century earlier? Is a fifty-year-old nexus still a valid nexus? If
the answer is yes, then is a hundred-year-old nexus still a valid
nexus, a hundred and fifty years, two hundred years, etc.?"
In Blue v. Department of Treasury,"' the Michigan Supreme
Court was faced with an inter vivos trust created by a Michi-
gan resident. The trustee was a resident of Florida and all
trust assets were located in Florida, except for a single non-
income producing parcel of real property located in Michigan.
152. A dynasty trust is a trust intended to last for a substantial period of time,
such as the maximum period of time allowed under the rule against perpetuities, or,
if the trust is not subject to the rule against perpetuities, indefinitely. See Al W.
King III et al., Dynasty Trusts: What the Future Holds for Today's Technique, TRUST
& ESTATES, April 1996, at 28-45.
153. If the trust is subject to the rule against perpetuities, a 200 year old trust
may not be possible. As previously noted, however, several states have abolished the
rule against perpetuities, and numerous international jurisdictions have no rule
against perpetuities. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
154. 462 N.W.2d 762 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
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The Blue court held that there were insufficient connections
between Michigan and the trust for the imposition of the in-
come tax. It addressed the fact that the nexus between Michi-
gan and the trust was a past event by means of the following
analogy: "We analogize the present case to a hypothetical stat-
ute authorizing that any person born in Michigan to resident
parents is deemed a resident and taxable as such, no matter
where they reside or own their income. We believe this would
be clearly outside the states' power to impose taxes."1
Certainly, there are some similarities between the hypotheti-
cal individual envisioned by the Blue court and a trust with
little connection to the state of its creation. Both the individual
and the trust are "created" in the potentially taxing state and,
sometime later, this fact is the sole connection between the
state and the individual or trust.
At the risk of stating the obvious, however, a trust is not an
individual, and there are important constitutional differences
between a trust created under the laws of a potentially taxing
state and an individual born to parents who are residents of
the state." A trust owes its existence to the laws of the tax-
ing state to a much greater extent than does the individual.
Even if the trust is governed by the laws of another state and
has been executed outside of the potentially taxing state, the
trust still owes a great deal to the state. It is the law of the
residence of the settlor/testator that has allowed her to accu-
mulate wealth and transfer it to the trust.
In contrast, an individual born to resident parents seems to
owe much less of her existence to the potentially taxing state.
Arguably an individual is, to some extent, "created" by the
munificent laws of the state of her birth. For example, the
individual was likely born in a state-licensed (or state-operated)
hospital and her parents likely arrived at the hospital via the
state-created or state-run infrastructure system.
It is, however, quite a stretch to draw an analogy between a
Resident Trust, with little connection to a potentially taxing
155. Blue, 462 N.W.2d at 764-65.
156. The analogy employed by the Blue court is not that outrageous. Similar stan-
dards, for example, establish the United States citizenship of an individual born to
United States residents. See 8 U.S.CA § 1401 (West 1970 & Supp. 1997).
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state, and an individual born to resident parents. While such a
trust can be said to be "created" under the laws of the resi-
dence of the settlor/testator, it is something of an intellectual
leap to make a similar argument about an individual being
"created" under the laws of his parents' residence. While there
are some similarities between the hypothetical individual dis-
cussed by the Blue court and the income taxation of a Resident
Trust with little connection to the potentially taxing state, the
differences seem to far outweigh the similarities. While it is
possible, as has been done in the preceding few paragraphs, to
draw similarities and distinctions between such an individual
and a trust, the basic difference is so fundamental as to defy
citation: individuals are not trusts.
The Supreme Court has held that an individual may be taxed
on her entire worldwide income by the state of her resi-
dence.'57 By labeling certain trusts "Resident Trusts," the
states attempt to tax trusts in a similar fashion. The constitu-
tional problem with this structure, however, is that the resi-
dence of an individual implies an ongoing connection between
the individual and the taxing state. Indeed, the Supreme
Court's decision that a state may tax the world-wide income of
its residents was based on the substantial ongoing benefits
provided by the state to the resident." In contrast, the "resi-
dence" of a trust is determined ab initio-an observation that
likely motivated the court's analogy in Blue of an income tax
based on the state of an individual's birth.'59
Thus, the issue of whether a Resident Trust may be taxed as
a resident of a particular state is not resolved by the "resident"
status of the trust. While there may be some intuitive appeal to
such an argument, the differences are too constitutionally sig-
nificant. Thus, the fact that individuals may constitutionally be
taxed based on residency does not necessarily imply that trusts
may be constitutionally taxed based on the concept of Resident
Trusts.
157. See Schaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920).
158. See New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 312 (1937) ("Enjoyment
of the privileges of residence in the state and the attendant right to invoke the pro-
tection of its laws are inseparable from responsibility for sharing the costs of gov-
ernment.").
159. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text; Blue, 462 N.W.2d at 764-65.
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At least one court has analogized, although not with quite
the same vehemence as the court in Blue, the income taxation
of a trust by the state of residence of the settlor/testator to the
income taxation of a corporation by the state of incorpora-
tion." ° Since the entire income of a corporation may be taxed
by the state of incorporation regardless of the place of the
corporation's business, this analogy attempts to justify the im-
position of income tax by the state of residence of the set-
tlor/testator. 6' The similarities between such a trust and a
corporation that does little or no business in the state of incor-
poration are striking. Both are created under the laws of the
potentially taxing state. Both, to some extent, seem to owe their
existence to the laws of that state.
The differences, however, are also substantial. A corporation,
unlike a trust, is an ongoing business. A corporation may
choose to reincorporate in another state, or a foreign jurisdic-
tion. In contrast, a trust, once created as a Resident trust, will
remain a "Resident Trust," until it terminates.62 Further, de-
pending on the laws of the state and the terms of the trust, it
may not be possible for the trust to terminate prior to the time,
if any, prescribed in the trust instrument."e
Another important distinction between a trust and a corpora-
tion is that a trust is a hybrid between an entity and a rela-
tionship between various parties. This dichotomy can be illus-
trated in numerous ways. For example, income tax is imposed
on the trust, which militates towards a conclusion that the
trust is an entity.' Moreover, the jurisdiction of the state
160. See District of Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d 539, 542 (D.C.
Cir. 1997).
161. See Cream of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks County, N.D., 253 U.S. 325, 328
(1920); 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NowAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITTIONAL LAW
§ 13.4 (2d ed., 1992).
162. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
163. Some states allow an irrevocable inter vivos trust to be revoked if all of the
beneficiaries and the settlor consent. See, eg., N.Y. EST. PowERS & TRuSTS LAW § 7-
1.9 (Consol. 1979 & Supp. 1997). This exception is, however, quite narrow, for exam-
ple, except in limited circumstances, a trust may not be terminated pursuant to
E.P.T.L. § 7-1.9 if any of the beneficiaries of the trust are minors. See Patrick J.
Rohan, New York Civil Practice-EPTL, 1 7-1.9; see generally FRATCHEE, supra note
133, §§ 329a-347.
164. See I.R.C. § 641(a) (1997). The trust, however, is treated as a conduit in that
it receives a deduction for items of income distributed to the beneficiaries. See LR.C.
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courts is, generally, discussed in terms of jurisdiction over the
trust rather than the parties." On the other hand, a trust
cannot sue or be sued. Rather, a prospective plaintiff would sue
the trustees and, correspondingly, if the trust is aggrieved, the
suit will be maintained by the trustees, as plaintiffs. 1" In-
deed, the fiduciary duties of trustees are owed to the beneficia-
ries rather than to the trust. In contrast, the directors of a
corporation owe their duties to the corporation. 7 Black's Law
Dictionary exemplifies this conflict in that it defines a trust
both as "a legal entity" and "a fiduciary relationship."
Another flaw of the corporation-trust analogy is that the
state of incorporation has a much closer ongoing relationship
with the corporation than does the state of creation of a trust.
For example, any person, whether or not a resident of Dela-
ware, may create a Delaware corporation; however, a Delaware
corporation must maintain a registered office in the State of
Delaware." A New York corporation must maintain an office
in New York.Y° In addition, a New York corporation must
designate the New York Secretary of State as its agent for the
service of process.' These contacts, however, are results of
the event-the incorporation of the corporation-that gives rise
to the taxation by the state of incorporation. This is, arguably,
similar to basing the constitutionality of taxing a trust on a
nexus, such as the continuing jurisdiction of that state's probate
courts, that is merely the result of the event that is the basis
§§ 651, 661 (1997).
165. See, e.g., N.Y. SuR- CT. PRoc. ACT § 207; BOGERT & BOGERT, TRUST &
TRUSTEES § 292, at 237 (2d ed., 1992) (explaining "the forum court must have juris-
diction over one or more of the trust, the trust parties, and the trust property).
166. See FRATCHER, supra note 133, §§ 280.6, 265, 277.
167. See 3 WLLAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 837.50 (1994 & Cum. Supp. 1997); see also In re Healthco Int'l Inc.,
208 B.R. 288 (Bank., D. Mass. 1997) (holding that the business judgment rule was
unavailable as a defense to directors of a corporation since the board resolved that a
particular Board action was in "the best interests of the company's stockholders"
rather than in the best interests of the company).
168. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1508 (6th ed. 1990).
169. See DEL. GEN. CORP. LAw §§ 101(a), 102(aX2) (1997). Frequently, the "regis-
tered office" is merely an agent used by the corporation for the service of process.
170. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 402(aX3) (1983 & Supp. 1997). The corporation
must file its certificate of incorporation in the New York county in which its office is
located.
171. See id. § 304(a).
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for the taxation of the trust by the state.172 As stated by the
Blue court, this may allow a constitutionally "suspect" classifica-
tion to be the nexus for a state's jurisdiction to tax."7
The state of incorporation bears a different relationship to
the corporation than does the state of the residence of the set-
tlor/testator to a trust. A corporation is created by the laws of
the state in which it is incorporated. It remains subject to those
laws for as long as it is incorporated in that state.174 In con-
trast, a trust is not necessarily governed by the law of the state
of residence of the settlor/testator at the creation of the
trust.75 Thus, a "Resident Trust" may be created by and exist
due to the law of another state. This difference in relationship
implies that while a corporation receives benefits from the state
of incorporation that may justify the imposition of income tax
by that state, a trust may not receive similar benefits from the
state of residence of the settlor/testator 76
There are, clearly, similarities and differences between trusts
and corporations that militate both for and against the efficacy
of a constitutional analogy between the two. The resolution may
be recognition of the fact that the differences between trusts
and corporations are too great to allow blind adherence to the
constitutional precedent regarding the income taxation of corpo-
rations.
B. Commerce Clause
If one concludes that the connection between the state of
residence of the settlor/testator of a trust is sufficient, in and of
itself, to constitutionally justify the imposition of an income tax
by the state upon the entire income of the trust under the due
172. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
173. See Blue v. Department of the Treasury, 462 N.W.2d 762, 764 (Mich. Ct. App.
1990).
174. See FLETCHER, supra note 167, § 4025.
175. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 165, § 301; see also N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 3-5.1(h) (1979); R.L GEN. LAWS §§ 18-1-1, 18-1-2 (1996). For example,
a trust created by a Rhode Island resident may provide that New York law governs
the agreement.
176. See Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
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process clause, then an additional inquiry must be made under
the commerce clause.
177
In Quill, the United States Supreme Court drew a distinction
between the nexus requirements of the due process clause and
the nexus requirement contained in the first and fourth prongs
of the Complete Auto commerce clause test. In holding that the
connections between a mail order house and a state permitted
imposition of a tax under the due process clause, but not under
the commerce clause, the Supreme Court effectively held that
the commerce clause requires a more substantial connection
between the state and the taxpayer than the "minimum connec-
tions" standard of the due process clause. The Court in Quill,
however, expressly limited its holding to sales and use tax-
es.17 Moreover, to the extent the Court's holding was pre-
mised on the fear of upsetting the well settled exemption of
mail order businesses from sales and use taxes, it is clearly
inapplicable to the income taxation of trusts.'
The reasoning of the commerce clause holding of Quill is,
however, arguably applicable to the income taxation of trusts.
The Court in Quill noted that the commerce clause, unlike the
due process clause, imposes limits on the power of a state to
tax in order to avoid overburdening interstate commerce with
state taxes."8 If the constitutional limits on the power of a
state to tax a trust were, for example, coextensive with a state
court's jurisdiction as provided in the state's probate code, then
every state in which the trust has property or in which a trust-
ee resides could tax the entire income of the trust. 8' It seems
that this overburdening of a multi-state trust is a circumstance
that the commerce clause holding of Quill sought to avoid.
If there is a sufficient connection between a state and a trust
to allow state taxation of the trust under the due process
177. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 308-09 (1992).
178. See id. at 317-18 ("In sum, although in our cases subsequent to Bellas Hess
and concerning other types of taxes we have not adopted a similar bright-line, physi-
cal-presence requirement, our reasoning in those cases does not compel that we now
reject the rule that Bellas Hess established in the area of sales and use taxes.") (em-
phasis added).
179. See id. at 318 n.10.
180. See id. at 313 n.7.
181. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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clause, then, under Quill, the issue becomes one of the mag-
nitude of the connections. If the connections between the trust
and the state are in the range that pass muster under the due
process clause but fail under the commerce clause, then the
state may not tax the trust regardless of the presence of "mini-
mum contacts" which satisfy the requirements of the due pro-
cess clause." Since this distinction seems quantitative rather
than qualitative, it is difficult to determine whether the connec-
tions between a trust and a state are sufficient to justify taxa-
tion under the commerce clause. Certainly, it seems that the
connections discussed above regarding the due process clause
would militate towards a conclusion that the standards of the
commerce clause are met. Considering the difficulty in deter-
mining whether these connections suffice in the due process
context, however, it seems nearly impossible to determine if
they are met in the commerce clause context. This is particular-
ly the case if the sole distinction between the two is the ques-
tion of magnitude, as suggested in Quill.
Perhaps the issue of the different nexus requirements under
the commerce and due process clauses can be viewed from a
different perspective. Prior to Quill, the overwhelming majority
of the cases held that a state whose sole connection to a trust
is that the settlor/testator was a resident of that state at the
time of the trust's creation may not constitutionally tax the
trust.
183
Additionally, it was generally thought that the nexus require-
ments of the due process clause and the commerce clause were
identical.' Indeed, prior to Quill, the courts that addressed
the constitutional limitations on the state taxation of Resident
Trusts drew no such distinction, although those decisions tend
to discuss the due process clause rather than the commerce
clause. If, however, one accepts the conclusion of most of the
182. Obviously, the connections between Quill Corporation and North Dakota were
of the magnitude described by this "band" between the two clauses.
183. See, e.g., Blue v. Department of the Treasury, 462 N.W.2d 762 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1990); Westfall v. Director of Revenue, 812 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. 1991); Swift v.
Director of Revenue, 727 S.W.2d 880 (Mo. 1987); Potter v. Taxation Div. Dir., 5 N.J.
Tax 399 (1983); Pennoyer v. Taxation Div. Dir., 5 N.J. Tax 386 (1983). See also supra
note 128 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
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state courts prior to Quill, that a state may not constitutionally
tax such a trust, the issue may be reduced to whether Quill
decreased the required connections under the due process
clause, increased the required connections under the commerce
clause, or both. To the extent the Supreme Court did either of
these, it seems that the Quill Court decreased the nexus re-
quirement of the due process clause and left the nexus require-
ment of the commerce clause unchanged.
The Quill Court overruled National Bellas Hess, but only
with respect to its due process clause holding. Since the facts of
National Bellas Hess and Quill are essentially identical, connec-
tions between a taxpayer and a state that were held insuffi-
cient under the due process clause in National Bellas Hess were
held sufficient in Quill. In contrast, connections that were held
insufficient under the commerce clause in National Bellas Hess
were similarly held insufficient in Quill.
Extrapolating from National Bellas Hess and Quill, one could
reasonably conclude that Quill decreased the connection re-
quired by the due process clause while leaving the nexus re-
quirement of the first and fourth prongs of the Complete Auto
commerce clause test unchanged. Thus, a connection that was
held insufficient under the due process clause prior to Quill,
when the due process nexus requirements were thought to be
coextensive with the commerce clause requirements, should be
constitutionally lacking under the commerce clause after Quill,
since the commerce clause requirements were not affected by
Quill. This argument may make some intuitive sense. There is,
however, no Supreme Court precedent holding that the mathe-
matical law of syllogism applies to constitutional due process
and commerce clause analysis.
C. State Court Decisions
In Swift v. Director of Revenue," the Missouri Supreme
Court provided what may be the most complete analysis of the
constitutional limitations on the state taxation of Resident
Trusts that has been undertaken by any court. The Swift court
185. 727 S.W.2d 880 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
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was confronted with a testamentary trust created under the
will of a Missouri resident. During the tax years in question,
none of the beneficiaries or trustees were Missouri residents, all
trust assets were located in Illinois and all trust business was
conducted in Illinois. The Swift court held:
In determining whether this state had sufficient nexus to
support the imposition of an income tax on trust income, we
consider six points of contact: (1) the domicile of the settlor,
(2) the place in which the trust is created, (3) the location
of trust property, (4) the domicile of the beneficiaries, (5)
the domicile of the trustees, and (6) the location of the
administration of the trust.'
The first two of these six possible points of contact are met by
a trust whose sole connection to the potentially taxing state is
the residence of the settlor/testator at the time of the creation
of the trust. The Swift court argued that, for the purposes of
supporting the constitutionality of the income tax, these first
two factors require the ongoing protection of the law of Missou-
ri only to the extent that one or more of the other four factors
are present. Thus, a trust created by a Missouri resident re-
quires the protection of Missouri law only if trustees, trust
property, or beneficiaries are Missouri domiciliaries, or, if the
trust is administered in Missouri. Based on this analysis, the
Swift court held that the trust did not require the ongoing
protection of the law of Missouri and, thus, was not subject to
income tax by the state of Missouri.
Clearly, the Swift court attempted to draw a reasoned consti-
tutional analysis from an area of law that the Supreme Court
has described a "quagmire."18 The shortcomings of the six fac-
tor Swift test are, to some extent, exemplified in Westfall v.
Director of Revenue," which was decided by the Missouri Su-
preme Court (the same jurisdiction as Swift) four years later.
The facts of Westfall were essentially identical to the facts of
Swift, except that the trust in Westfall earned $3,500 of rental
income from real property located in Missouri. The Westfall
court, in what it described as a mere application of the six fac-
186. Id. at 882.
187. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992).
188. 812 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. 1991) (en bane).
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tor Swift test, held that the presence of the Missouri real prop-
erty implied that the trust now met the first, second and third
of the six possible connections. Thus, Missouri was not constitu-
tionally prohibited from taxing the entire income of the
trust.
189
The six-part Swift test does not, however, reach the same
conclusion that has been reached by some of the other state
courts. For example, in Potter v. Taxation Division Director,"9
a New Jersey resident created an inter vivos trust. During the
tax years in question, the trustee, beneficiaries, and trust as-
sets were located without New Jersey; however, a few contin-
gent beneficiaries were New Jersey residents. 91 The New Jer-
sey Tax Court held that these connections were insufficient to
allow New Jersey to constitutionally tax the trust. In contrast,
if the facts of Potter are tested against the standard established
in Swift, the trust in Potter would meet the first (domicile of
the testator), second (place in which the trust is created) and
fourth (domicile of beneficiaries) of the six Swift factors; there-
fore, under Swift, the Potter trust should be subject to taxation
by New Jersey.192
189. See id. at 514. In addition to the Missouri real property, "under certain con-
tingencies" Missouri charities would receive distributions and one of the charities was,
potentially, a successor trustee. The WestfaU decision does not seem to be based on
these two additional connections to any significant degree. Indeed, these connections
are discussed in only two sentences of the decision and are not mentioned by the
dissent or the concurrence. This is somewhat curious since, as will be discussed infra,
the residence of contingent beneficiaries seems to constitutionally justify the increased
taxation of the trust by the state of residence of the settlor/testator under the reason-
ing of Swift. See infra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
The concurrence argued that the decision reached by the majority, while con-
stitutionally correct, was not a mere application of the six factor Swift test. See
Westfall, 812 S.W.2d at 515. The dissent, in contrast, argued that the result reached
by the majority is inconsistent with Swift. See id. at 516-17 (Blackmar, J., dissent-
ing). The dissent noted, "the director [of revenue] argues that if the trust income
from intangibles is not subject to taxation in Missouri it will not be taxed anywhere.
I am unable to see how this is demonstrated by the record before us but, even if it
is, it makes no difference." Id. at 517 (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
190. 5 N.J. Tax 399 (1983).
191. See id. at 405.
192. This analysis assumes that when the Swift court discussed the residence of
the beneficiaries, it meant to include both current and contingent beneficiaries. This
is a reasonable assumption since the interests of the Missouri resident contingent
beneficiaries would "require the ongoing protection... of [Missouri] state law." Swift
v. Director of Revenue, 727 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Mo. 1987).
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This hypothetical application of the Swift test to the facts of
Potter may seem to be an indication of the overly formalistic
approach of the Swift court; however, it is also, arguably, a
vindication of the reasoning in Swift. As discussed above, Swift
held that the mere creation of the trust in the potentially tax-
ing state, i.e., the satisfaction of the first two factors, only ne-
cessitated the continuing protection of the state to the extent
that one of the other four factors is present. If, as in Potter,
there are contingent beneficiaries that reside in the potentially
taxing state, then the interests of these contingent resident
beneficiaries may require the protection of the law of the poten-
tially taxing state. Thus, the state of residence of the set-
tlor/testator may constitutionally tax the entire income of the
trust. Therefore, while Swift is inconsistent with Potter, this
may be the result of the Potter court's failure to consider the
ramifications of the residence of the contingent beneficiaries,
rather than evidence of an overly formalistic approach in Swift.
The situation addressed in Westfall is more difficult. Since
the income derived from the Missouri real property is Missouri
source income, Missouri could clearly tax that income.'93 The
Westfall court, however, used the presence of this small amount
of Missouri source income as a "hook" to justify taxing the
entire income of the trust. The Westfall court did not discuss
the total annual income of the trust. The lack of such a discus-
sion implies that the proportional magnitude of the Missouri
source income was not a factor in the court's decision. Thus,
even if the Missouri source income was a minimal portion of
the trust's total income, its presence would allow the state to
impose an income tax on the entire trust income. If the income
of the trust is substantial enough, as compared to the source
income from the state, the tax imposed by the state due to this
source income may be many times the value of the source in-
come. For example, in Westfall, it is likely that the income tax
imposed by Missouri exceeded the $3,500 of Missouri source
income earned by the trust.'"
193. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 143.181 (West 1996); New York ex rel. Whitney v.
Graves, 299 U.S. 366 (1937).
194. As mentioned, the Westfall court did not disclose the total amount of income
earned by the trust during the tax year. As a practical matter, however, it seems
unlikely that the trustees would find it economically prudent to litigate the issue un-
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Moreover, the holding of Westfall is inconsistent with Blue. In
Blue, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that an inter vivos
trust created by a Michigan resident could not be taxed by
Michigan despite the fact that the trust held a parcel of non-
income producing real property.'95 The facts of Blue are not
"on all fours" with Westfall. Blue involved an inter vivos rather
than a testamentary trust and the real property in Westfall was
income producing ($3,500) while the real property in Blue pro-
duced no income." Both the Westfall and Blue trusts, howev-
er, met the first (domicile of the settlor), second (place in which
the trust is created), and third (location of trust property) of
the six Swift factors.'97 Therefore, the Swift test implies that
both the Blue and Westfall trusts may be constitutionally taxed
by their respective states, which is contrary to the holding of
Blue.
The limitations of Swift are not necessarily evident from the
application of the Swift test to the facts of Westfall, Potter, Blue
or any other individual set of facts." Instead, the flaw is in-
herent in the Swift court's attempt to create a test to fit every
set of facts, rather than undertaking a less formalistic analysis
of the underlying constitutional issues.
C. Constitutional Differences Between Inter Vivos and
Testamentary Trusts
To a large extent, the issues discussed herein are unaffected
by a trust's status as a testamentary or inter vivos trust. In-
deed, some of the courts that have addressed this issue have
not clearly delineated the distinctions between the two types of
trusts, in terms of the constitutional nexuses between each type
of trust and the state of its creation.' In contrast, in Chase,
less the total amount of tax potentially owed to the State of Missouri far exceeded
the $3,500 of Missouri source income.
195. See Blue v. Department of the Treasury, 462 N.W.2d 762, 763 (Mich. Ct. App.
1990).
196. See id.; Westfall v. Director of Revenue, 812 S.W.2d 513, 513 (Mo. 1991);
Swift, 727 S.W.2d at 882.
197. See Swift, 727 S.W.2d at 882.
198. See infra notes 245-62 and accompanying text.
199. See, e.g., Blue, 462 N.W.2d at 764 (addressing an inter vivos trust but dis-
cussing cases, such as Swift, at length without mention of the fact that they involved
210 [Vol. 32:165
STATE TAXATION OF TRUSTS
which upheld the imposition of an income tax on a testamen-
tary trust, the court noted that its analysis with respect to a
testamentary trust may not hold true with respect to inter
vivos trusts."
Much of the analysis contained herein is not affected by the
"character" of the trust. Mention must be made, however, of the
closer relationship between the state of residence of the testator
of a testamentary trust and the state of residence of the settlor
of an inter vivos trust.
A state's probate courts have "primary jurisdiction" over a
testamentary trust created under the will of a resident of that
state."' No such primary jurisdiction exists in the case of in-
ter vivos trusts. The closer relationship between testamentary
trusts and the potentially taxing state is apparent in numerous
ways. For example, a testamentary trustee is, generally, ap-
pointed by the probate court, and prior to doing so, the probate
court must ascertain that the potential trustee is qualified to
act as trustee. 2 Moreover, the state may require that a testa-
mentary trustee post a bond, swear to faithfully discharge her
duties, etc.' In contrast, a probate court generally will not be
involved in the selection of trustees of an inter vivos trust.'°4
Certainly, the probate court may remove a trustee, or fill a
vacancy;" however, for the most part the court is uninvolved.
testamentary trusts).
200. See District of Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d 539, 547 n.11
(D.C. Cir. 1997); see also Potter v. Taxation Div. Dir., 5 N.J. Tax 399, 405 (1983).
Potter involved an inter vivos trust and the Court held that the connections were less
substantial than in Pennoyer v. Taxation Div. Dir., 5 N.J. Tax 386 (1983), since
Pennoyer involved a testamentary trust.
201. See Feltman v. Coulter, 528 P.2d 821, 824 n.1 (Ariz. 1974) (en banc) ("The
rule of law is well settled that the courts of the testator's domicile and of the state
in which the will is probated have primary jurisdiction over testamentary trusts.");
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 267 (1971); FRATCHER, supra note
133, § 570.
202. See FRATCHER, supra note 133, § 557; see, e.g., IOWA CODE § 633.10(4) (West
1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-107 (1994); N.Y. SuRm CT. PRoc. ACT §§ 707, 708
(1980 & Supp. 1997).
203. See, e.g., N.Y. SuRR. CT. PRoc. ACT § 708.
204. See FRATCHER, supra note 133, § 557; see, eg., IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.10(4);
N.Y. SuR. CT. PRoc. ACT § 724.
205. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.10(4); N.Y. SURIL CT. PROC. ACT § 709. In
this case, the court would determine the suitability of the potential trustee and hear
objections to her appointment.
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Further, states that require a trustee to submit periodic ac-
counting, make this requirement of testamentary, but not of
inter vivos, trusts.0 6 Moreover, some states require that the
account of a testamentary trustee be settled judicially; however,
all states allow the trustee of an inter vivos trust to settle his
account informally.0 7
The closer relationship between a testamentary trust and the
state of that trust's creation, as compared to the relationship
between an inter vivos trust and its state of creation, may be
constitutionally significant. These additional connections may
constitutionally justify the imposition of a state income tax on
a testamentary trust whose sole connection to the potentially
taxing state is the residence of the testator, even if the resi-
dence of the settlor of an inter vivos trust may not provide a
sufficient constitutional nexus for taxation.
The differences between a testamentary and an inter vivos
trust are clearly significant. In determining whether the neces-
sary "minimum contacts" exist between a trust and a state for
due process purposes, or in determining whether the necessary
nexus is present for commerce clause purposes, the added con-
nections between a testamentary trust and the state must be
taken into consideration."°
The additional contacts between a testamentary trust and the
state, however, are derived from the same event that is the
basis for the imposition of the income tax on the trust; namely,
the residence of the testator. This one event determines the
location of the probate proceedings, the court that appoints the
testamentary trustees, and provides the basis for the tax and
the continuing jurisdiction of those courts."°c Therefore, at-
206. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-177 (West 1993); D.C. CIV. R. 305;
IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.10(4); HENDRICKSON & ROTELLA, supra note 143, § 48.20[1].
207. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-179 (West 1993). Settlement of the
trustees account is the approval of either an informal or a court formal accounting
prepared by the trustees. Settlement of the account releases the trustee from liability
for the time period covered by the accounting. See HENDRICKSON & ROTELLA, supra
note 143, §§ 48.03, 48.20; BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 165, § 974.
208. The nexus requirement is contained in the first and fourth prongs of the
Complete Auto commerce clause test. See supra notes 93-106 and accompanying text.
The "minimum contacts7 standard for due process analysis was discussed in Quill,
which adopted the standard established in International Shoe. See Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307 (1992).
209. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 165, § 292; see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
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tempting to constitutionally justify the imposition of the income
tax on a testamentary trust based on these additional connec-
tions shares the same logical flaw as does basing the constitu-
tionality of the tax on the continuing jurisdiction of the courts
over the trust.210 Both the primary jurisdiction over a testa-
mentary trust and the imposition of the income tax are based
on the same event-the residence of the testator at the time of
his death. This connection must be determined constitutionally
sufficient or insufficient.
Even this initial connection, however, may be greater in the
context of testamentary trusts. A state's probate courts, and
therefore the state, are much more closely involved in the crea-
tion of a testamentary trust, as discussed above. Therefore, in
determining whether there is a sufficient constitutional con-
nection between a trust and a state, based on the event of the
trust's creation, one must consider whether the trust is a testa-
mentary or inter vivos trust. In the case of a testamentary
trust, the possible connections between the trust and the poten-
tially taxing state are more significant. Whether these addition-
al connections are significant enough to constitutionally justify
the imposition of the income tax on the entire income of the
trust is unclear. The additional connections are effects of the
residence of the testator at the time of his death. Thus, the
basis of these connections is the same past event that provides
the statutory basis for the imposition of the income tax-an
event that potentially occurred long before the particular tax
year. This possible lapse of time is the same constitutional
problem addressed earlier in this article.211 Is a past nexus a
constitutional basis for taxation? Does a nexus "wear off" over
the passage of time?
VI. POLICY ISSUES
Having considered the issue of whether or not a state may
constitutionally tax a trust where the only connection between
the trust and the state is the fact that the settlor/testator was
ANN. § 45a-98 (West 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1997); N.Y. SURE. CT. PROC. ACT § 205.
210. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 150-76 and accompanying text.
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a resident of that state at the time of creation of the trust, this
article now turns to normative considerations. Namely, the
issue of whether a state should tax such a trust.
The overriding issue that militates against state income taxa-
tion of such a trust is the issue of fairness. A trust taxed as a
Resident Trust may pay substantial income tax to a state that
has had no connection with it for some significant period of
time, perhaps several decades.2 2 If the imposition of a state
tax can be seen as payment for the services and benefits re-
ceived from the taxing state,21 then such a trust would pay
taxes to a state, yet receive little in return during that tax
year. This seems inequitable. The inequity is exacerbated by
the potential for the trust to be subject to additional state in-
come tax in other states that, for example, base the imposition
of the income tax on the residence of the trustees or beneficia-
ries.2 4 In all likelihood, the state that taxes the trust as a
Resident Trust will allow that trust a credit for the taxes paid
to the other state. Such credits, however, do not fully avoid
double taxation.15 Moreover, a taxing state is not required to
provide such a credit.
Of course, this issue could arise with respect to a trust that
has a constitutionally sufficient nexus with more than one
state. For example, a New Jersey Resident Trust with one New
Jersey resident trustee and one California resident trustee
would be taxed by New Jersey on all of its income and by Cali-
fornia on one-half of its income.2 6 This result also seems ar-
guably inequitable. Moreover, the potential for unfairness is ag-
gravated absent constitutional limitations on the power of a
state to tax a Resident Trust.
Altering the facts of the preceding example, suppose that the
trust was a District of Columbia Resident Trust. The sole trust-
ee is a Mississippi resident. All beneficiaries are residents of
California and all trust property is located outside the District
212. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
213. See Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
214. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 17742-17744 (West 1994).
215. See Goldstein, supra note 94, at 125-27.
216. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17744; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 54A-1-2(oX3Xa),
54A.2-1 (West 1986 & Cure. Supp. 1997).
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of Columbia, California and Mississippi. As a District of Colum-
bia Resident Trust, the District of Columbia would tax all trust
income, despite the attenuated connections between the trust
and the District.217 California would tax all of the income of
the trust since all of the beneficiaries are California resi-
dents.2 8 Mississippi, which bases its tax on the residence of
the trustees, would also tax all of the income of the trust.19
Thus, the trust would be subject to multiple state taxation on
all of its income. If, however, the Constitution were to limit the
power of a state to tax a Resident Trust, then this trust would,
at worst, be taxed on all of its income by Mississippi and Cali-
fornia, but would not be taxed by the District of Columbia.
Moreover, if the residence of the beneficiaries was held to be an
insufficient nexus, as in Safe Deposit, then California would
also be constitutionally prevented from taxing the trust. Of
course, this example is extreme. Generally, the issue will be
potential taxation of all of the trust's income by two, rather
than three states. This example illustrates, however, that while
a constitutional limit on a state's power to tax a Resident Trust
may not eliminate double taxation in all contexts, it decreases
the potential in most situations.
In light of this potential for inequity, a court may feel com-
pelled to hold that a state is constitutionally prohibited from
taxing a trust where the sole connection between the state and
the trust is the residence of the settlor/testator at the time of
the creation of the trust. Even if a state is not constitutionally
prohibited from taxing such a trust, the state legislature may
follow the examples of Connecticut and Massachusetts, which
exempt a trust from the "Resident Trust" classification if the
only connection between the trust and the state is the residence
of the settlor/testator. °
217. See District of Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d 539, 543 (D.C.
Cir. 1997).
218. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 17742, 17744.
219. See MIss. CODE ANN. § 27-7-27 (1972); Taxpayers and Rates [Miss.], State Tax
guide (CCH) 15-561 (Nov. 1996).
220. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-701(aX4) (Cum. Supp. 1997); MASS. ANN.
LAWS Ch. 62, § 10(c) (Law. Co-op 1990). The New York Department of Taxation reg-
ulations exempt such trusts; however, the Commission of Taxation amended its regu-
lations after unsuccessfully litigating this battle numerous times. See supra note 56
and accompanying text.
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Thus, fairness is the sole issue that militates for a constitu-
tional limit on the power of a state to tax a Resident Trust. In
contrast, numerous factors tend toward the conclusion that a
state may constitutionally tax a trust where the only connection
between the state and the trust is the residence of the set-
tior/testator at the time of creation of the trust.
Noted commentators in the area of state taxation have ar-
gued that constitutional limitations on a state's power to tax
Resident Trusts would lead to tax avoidance.221 While this ar-
gument is not fully developed, it seems that this assertion is
based on the assumption that an individual who plans to create
a trust will arrange the trust so that it could take advantage of
such a constitutional limitation and avoid payment of state
income tax altogether. For example, a Missouri resident who
wishes to create a testamentary trust for his children may, if
the children are not Missouri residents, appoint a trustee locat-
ed outside the state of Missouri in order to avoid the Missouri
income tax.' Moreover, a trust that has only a minor connec-
tion to a particular taxing state may, in an effort to avoid in-
come taxation by that state, divest itself of that connection. For
example, a trust whose sole connection to a state is ownership
of real property located in that state may sell or distribute such
property. If the sole connection is the residence of a trustee,
that trustee may resign.2
Considering the magnitude of state income tax rates, this
possible tax avoidance argument clearly has some merit.224
221. See, e.g., HELLERTEIN & HELLE1sTEiN, supra note 40, I 20.09[2].
222. See Swift v. Director of Revenue, 727 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Mo. 1987). If such an
individual actually wanted to create a trust for the benefit of individuals located
within and without Missouri, she could create two trusts. One trust would have con-
nections to Missouri and, thus, be subject to Missouri income tax, the other would be
drafted to have no connections to Missouri and would be exempt from Missouri in-
come tax.
223. See Westfall v. Director of Revenue, 812 S.W.2d 513, 514 (Mo. 1991). In
Westfall, the entire income of the trust was subject to income taxation by Missouri
due to a small parcel of income-producing Missouri real property. See id. It seems
likely that the trustees sold the property, if permitted to do so by the trust instru-
ment, soon after the Westfall decision.
224. See Table of 1997 Rates, State Tax Guide (CCH) T 15-100 (Aug. 1997). The
highest state income rate is 12%, which is imposed by North Dakota on income in
excess of $50,000. See Taxpayers and Rates [N.D.], State Tax Guide (CCH) S 15-711
(Sept. 1997); see also Goldstein, supra note 94, at 119-20 (noting that the burden of
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This is especially true considering that if a Resident Trust is
not taxed by its state of residence, it will likely escape state'
income taxation altogether.' This argument, however, fails to
recognize that a taxpayer may arrange her activities in such a
way so as to minimi e her tax burden.' This is no more of
an egregious example of tax avoidance than when a resident of
New York relocates to Florida, in order to decrease her state
income tax burden. The tax avoidance argument is untenable
because the settlor/testator essentially would be arranging her
affairs in such a way as to minimize the tax burden. While this
may to some extent be labeled tax avoidance, it is more fairly
viewed as tax planning that does not militate against a consti-
tutional limit on the taxation of Resident Trusts.'
An argument that does militate against constitutional limits
on the state taxation of Resident Trusts is the fact that such a
constitutional limitation will, to the extent that it is applied,
frequently result in a trust owing no state income tax. This
result is not constitutionally significant, but it is, however,
arguably unfair.' Of course, a trust that has connections to a
state with no income tax may avoid payment of state income
tax, such as a trust created by a resident of Florida.' In this
case, however, the trust merely is benefiting from the state
legislature's decision not to impose an income tax. Constitution-
al limitations on state income taxation of Resident Trusts
would allow a trust with connections solely to relatively high
income tax states to wholly escape state income taxation. For
example, a testamentary trust created under the will of a New
Jersey resident, where the beneficiaries and trustees are resi-
providing numerous government services has been shifted to the states resulting in
increased state taxes).
225. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
226. This point was quite eloquently stated by Judge Learned Hand: "Any one may
so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to
choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic
duty to increase one's taxes" Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d. Cir. 1934),
affd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
227. See generally Paul J. Donahue, The Rule of Sheldon v. Commissioner: Is it an
Economically Efficient Evolution of the Sham Transaction Doctrine?, 13 VA. TAX REV.
165 (1993).
228. See Westfall v. Director of Revenue, 812 S.W.2d 513, 517 (Mo. 1991)
(Blackmer, J., dissenting).
229. See FLA. CoNST. art. 7, § 5(a).
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dents of New York and Connecticut, would not be taxed by any
state." ° Thus, in this case, a trust that has connections only
to states that impose an income tax wholly escapes state taxa-
tion. To the extent that the trust receives benefit from any of
these states, such as using the state courts, the trust receives a
benefit without making payment therefor in the form of state
income taxes.
An administrative problem with a constitutional limit on the
state income taxation of Resident Trusts is that the trust's
liability to the state will be constitutionally barred in certain
years and not in others. As the Virginia Tax Department noted,
a trust that had no connection to Virginia during a particular
tax year could not constitutionally be taxed by Virginia that
year; however, circumstances may change-trustees or benefi-
ciaries may relocate in Virginia, trust assets may be brought
into Virginia, etc. 1 If any of these connections arise in later
years, then during that tax year, Virginia would no longer be
prohibited from imposing an income tax on the trust. This is
certainly an added complexity in the state income taxation of
trusts in light of constitutional limitations on the state taxation
of Resident Trusts.
The argument that this added complexity militates against a
constitutional limit on the state income taxation of Resident
Trusts is weak. The annual inquiry that must be made to de-
termine if a state may constitutionally tax is, mutatis mutan-
dis, the same annual inquiry that must be made regarding the
residence of an individual. Admittedly, the determination of the
residence of an individual may be easier; however, the charac-
ter of the two issues is similar. Therefore, while constitutional
230. This trust would be a New Jersey Resident Trust, but the New Jersey Tax
Court has held that such a trust may not be constitutionally taxed- by New Jersey.
See Pennoyer v. Taxation Div. Dir., 5 N.J. Tax 386, 398 (1983).
Neither New York nor Connecticut would classify such trust as a "Resident
Trust7 and, therefore, would impose an income tax only on the New York or Connect-
icut source income of the trust. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 12-701(a)(4), 12-700(b)
(Cum. Supp. 1997); N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 631, 633, 601(e); see also supra notes 1-14 and
accompanying text. Of course, the trust may be taxed on source income from any par-
ticular state by that state. See New York en rel. Whitney v. Graves, 299 U.S. 366,
374 (1937).
231. See, e.g., Virginia Dep't of Tax. Letter Ruling, 1993 WL 372991 (Aug. 26,
1993).
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limits on the state income taxation of Resident Trusts may
cause administrative difficulties, the states have not found
similar administrative difficulties overwhelming in analogous
situations.
Perhaps the overriding advantage of a structure that defines
certain trusts as Resident Trusts ab initio is its simplicity.
Such a structure determines to which state the trust will pay
income tax at the time of creation of the trust. Further, under
this structure, the residence of a trust is, for the most part,
easily determined, or at least as easily determined as the resi-
dence of the settlor/testator. 2
The states could further the purpose of avoiding double taxa-
tion and administrative simplicity if they were to adopt a single
system. In the unitary business context, the Supreme Court has
refused to dictate a particular method of apportionment of a
unitary business' income. The Supreme Court has, however,
required that each method of apportionment be "internally
consistent." A state taxation structure is internally consistent if,
assuming that every jurisdiction adopted an identical system, it
would result in no more than all of the entity's income being
taxed.' If one were to apply this "internal consistency" re-
quirement to the income taxation of trusts, both the Resident
Trust system and taxation based on the residence of the trust-
ees (or beneficiaries) are internally consistent. Each of these
systems are internally consistent because, if every state adopted
any one of these systems, none of them would result in more
than all of the trust's income being taxed.' Therefore, while
232. Of course, the residence of the settlor/testator may not always be easily deter-
mined. For example, upon the death of Howard Hughes, both Texas and California
asserted that Mr. Hughes was a resident of that state and both states imposed an
estate tax on Mr. Hughes' estate. See Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 86 (1982).
233. See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983).
234. See id. With respect to the Resident Trust taxation structure, since, theoreti-
cally, the settlor/testator could have only one residence at the time of creation of the
trust, only one state would define the trust a Resident Trust and, thus, only this
state would tax the entire income of the trust. Therefore, this system is internally
consistent.
The California system, which bases the income tax on the proportion of benefi-
ciaries or trustees that are California residents, may not be internally consistent
since, if every state were to adopt an identical system, the entire income of the trust
would be taxed by the state of residence of the trustees and the state of residence of
the beneficiaries. See CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE §§ 17742-17744 (West 1994).
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it may be superior, from a policy point of view, for all states to
adopt a uniform basis for the income taxation of trusts, it is
unlikely that the Supreme Court is going to force such a stan-
dard. Further, there does not seem to be movement among the
states to adopt such a uniform system.
The policy issues discussed in this part militate both for and
against the constitutional rule discussed in this article. On the
one hand, such a constitutional rule may result in tax avoid-
ance and facilitate a trust in escaping state income taxation.
On the other hand, such a constitutional limitation serves the
purpose of avoiding a trust's liability for income tax to a state
that has an attenuated connection to the trust and from which
the trust receives little or no benefit. Such a constitutional
limitation also limits the possibilities of double taxation. There-
fore, just as no clear answer arises from the application of
constitutional precedent to this issue, no clear answer arises,
from a policy perspective, regarding whether the existence of
such a rule is preferable.
VII. TRUSTEE ISSUES
If a state is constitutionally prohibited from taxing a trust
where the sole connection between the trust and the state is
the residence of the settlor/testator at the time of creation of
the trust, numerous issues involving the trustees of such a
trust arise. Namely, if the sole nexus between a taxing state
and a trust is the residence of a particular trustee, may that
trustee be removed so that the trust can avoid such state's
income tax? Further, an issue arises as to who is a trustee for
constitutional nexus purposes.
The residence of the trustees is a crucial nexus between a
trust and the potentially taxing state.' Indeed, the residence
of the trustee in and of itself constitutionally justifies the impo-
235. The residence of the trustees is the fifth of the six Swift factors. See Swift v.
Director of Revenue, 727 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Mo. 1987). Further, if the trustee is a
resident of a particular state, it is likely that the trust would be administered in that
state (the sixth Swift factor). Therefore, the residence of the trustee determines at
least one and possibly two of the Swift factors.
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sition of a state income tax." Moreover, the Supreme Court
has noted that the state of residence of the trustee may be the
preferred jurisdiction for a single tax on the trust. 7
Posit a Resident Trust where the only connection between it
and the potentially taxing state, aside from the residence of the
settlor/testator, is the fact that one of numerous trustees is a
resident of that state. Based on the residence of that one trust-
ee, the state constitutionally taxes all of the income of the
trust. Clearly, depending on the magnitude of the income tax
imposed by the state, there would be some impetus for such a
trustee to resign.m If that trustee does not wish to resign,
may he be removed?
Generally, a trustee will be removed only for a relatively
serious breach of trust. 9 For example, a trustee may typical-
ly be removed for incompetence or for breach of his duties, such
as a duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries. 24 A trustee may also
be removed for disagreement or disharmony between the trust-
ees or between the trustee whose removal is sought and the
beneficiaries, but in order to be removed, the trustee must
generally be at fault, the disharmony must be relatively severe
and it must endanger the trust. 1 If a trustee invests impru-
236. See Greenough v. Tax Assessors, 331 U.S. 486, 498 (1947).
237. See id. at 490. ("It may well be that sound fiscal policy would be promoted by
a tax upon trust intangibles levied only by the State that is the seat of a testamen-
tary trust. Or, it may be that the actual domicile of the trustee should be preferred
for a single tax).
238. In the case of a testamentary trustee, the trustee may need the permission of
the court to resign absent an instruction in the will permitting resignation. See
FRATCHER, supra note 133, § 106; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 19-3-210 (1990 Repl. Vol.);
MD. CODE ANN. EsT. & TRusTs § 15-111 (1991 Rep]. Vol.); N.Y. SURE. CT. PROC. ACT
§ 715 (Consol. 1980). As a practical matter, however, courts do not frequently force a
testamentary trustee who wishes to resign for a good reason to continue to serve. See
FRATCHER, supra note 133, § 106.1.
239. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 165, § 527; FRATCHER, supra note 133, §
107; see, ag., In re Estate of Weiss, 227 N.Y.S.2d 378, 383 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1962)
(refusing to remove a fiduciary despite a finding that he acted "arbitrarily" and "un-
duly complicated the administration of the estate"); Estate of Rad, N.Y.L.J., July 6,
1994, at 28, Col. 6 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1994) (removing fiduciary who threatened to
'mutilate" co-fiduciary's spouse).
240. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRuSTs § 107, cmt b (1959); 76 Am. JUR. 2D
Trusts §§ 258-260 (1992).
241. See 63 A.L.R.2d 523-44; 76 AIL JUR. 2D Trusts § 261 (1992).
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dently, but in good faith, and causes losses to the trust, the
remedy is surcharge of the trustee rather than removal.'
Considering the high standard required for removal of a
trustee, it seems unlikely that a court would remove a trustee
where the sole basis for his removal is the fact that, through no
fault of his own, his position as trustee subjects the trust to
income taxation by a particular state. This situation is some-
what analogous to a situation where a trustee's removal is
sought because the beneficiaries of the trust wish to avoid pay-
ing his commissions. It seems quite clear that, considering the
narrow grounds for which removal is granted, such a trustee
would not be removed. Therefore, it is unlikely that a trustee
may be removed simply for the fact that her position as trustee
subjects the trust to income taxation by a particular state.
A more interesting question from a constitutional perspective
is, who is deemed to be a trustee? For example, suppose the
only connection between a New Jersey Resident Trust and New
Jersey is the fact that a trust protector is a resident of New
Jersey.' Is the residence of the trust protector a sufficient
connection between New Jersey and the trust to constitutionally
justify the income taxation of the trust by New Jersey? Further,
what if rather than a trust protector, a New Jersey investment
advisor was delegated broad authority by the trustees to make
investment decisions on behalf of the trust? Could this be a
constitutionally sufficient nexus?
242. See 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts §§ 481-82 (1992).
243. A trust protector is sometimes used in a situation where a settlor/testator
desires to give a certain individual some control over the trust, but, perhaps for tax
reasons, does not wish to give this person the more substantial powers of a trustee.
For example, if a trustee has a beneficial interest in the trust, then if she, as trust-
ee, has the power to make discretionary distributions to herself, as beneficiary, she
would have a general power of appointment, for gift and estate tax purposes. See
I..C. § 2041 (1997). Thus, every exercise of the trusteebeneficiary's power in favor of
another would be a taxable gift. In this situation, an independent party may be ap-
pointed trust protector in order to control the discretionary distributions to the benefi-
ciary/trustee.
Trust protectors are frequently involved in the area of foreign trusts. If an
individual wishes to create a foreign trust in order to protect assets from her domes-
tic creditors, appointing a U.S. citizen as a trustee may vitiate this purpose. Typical-
ly, however, a U.S. settlor will wish to appoint a U.S. individual to oversee the ac-
tions of the foreign trustee and to control some trust decisions. The use of a trust
protector for that role is common. See Howard M. Zaritsky, Foreign Trusts, Estates
and Beneficiaries, 911 T.M. (BNA) (Dec. 8, 1997).
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It would, of course, be simpler to ignore the residence of any
party other than the trustees, settlor/testator and beneficiaries.
In some situations, however, such a bright-line rule seems to
make little sense. For example, a trust protector who controls
trust distributions and trust investments seems to have a closer
relationship to a trust than the trustee who is, effectively,
merely the custodian of the trust assets. In this case, it seems
that the residence of the trust protector should be at least as
constitutionally significant as the residence of the trustee. In
contrast, if the trust protector's only power is to remove one
corporate trustee and appoint another corporate trustee, per-
haps the residence of the trust protector does not create any
meaningful constitutional nexus between the trust and her
state of residence.
From a constitutional perspective, the identity of the trustee
is not the essential issue. The issue is the nexus between the
trust and the potentially taxing state. To the extent this nexus
can be satisfied merely by the residence of a trustee,' it
should be equally satisfied by the residence of a trust protector
or investment advisor whose power over the trust is sufficiently
broad. Therefore, who is a trustee for constitutional nexus pur-
poses is not the appropriate question. The correct question is
who are the parties with significant connections to the trust
and are those connections significant enough to constitutionally
justify the imposition of the income tax by that party's state of
residence? It is important to realize, however, that expanding
the class of individuals whose residence may be constitutionally
significant increases the complexity of a constitutional limita-
tion on the state income taxation of Resident Trusts.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This article now comes to the point where an attempt must
be made to draw a conclusion from the various pronouncements
regarding the constitutional limitations on state taxation as
they apply to trusts. In effect, order must be made out of the
244. See Greenough v. Tax Assessors, 331 U.S. 486, 498 (1947).
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"quagmire" that the Supreme Court has admitted its precedent
has created in this area."5
First and foremost, the primary issue of this article must be
discussed. Namely, may a state constitutionally tax a trust
where the only connection between the trust and the state is
the residence of the settlor/testator at the time of the trust's
creation? Unfortunately, the answer to this question is not
clear. On the one side, the event that is the purported nex-
us-the creation of the trust-may have occurred decades
ago. During any given tax year, such a trust may have no
more connection to the potentially taxing state than does a
fifty-year-old resident of another state who was born in that
state. 7 On the other hand, the creation of the trust is a sig-
nificant event. It is this event that, under state law, provides
the basis for numerous connections between the state and the
trust, such as the jurisdiction of state courts over the trust.A
Of course, allowing these connections, which are based on the
residence of the settlor/testator to constitutionally justify a tax
imposed based on the residence of the settlor/testator, is flawed
reasoning." As some of the courts that have addressed this
issue have noted, the availability of the state courts is a signifi-
cant benefit conferred upon the trust by the state. Thus, the
state has given something for which it may ask for payment in
the form of income tax.' ° This argument does not, however,
address the concern that it allows the state through a "constitu-
tionally suspect" classification system to overreach its jurisdic-
tion to tax.5
Coupled with these concerns is the problem that trusts are in
a unique situation when it comes to the constitutionality of a
state income tax imposed on them. A state of incorporation may
tax all of the income of the corporation."2 The contacts creat-
245. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992).
246. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
247. See Blue v. Department of the Treasury, 462 N.W.2d 762, 764-65 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1990).
248. See FRATCHER, supra note 133, § 565-67.
249. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
250. See Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
251. See Blue, 462 N.W.2d at 764.
252. See Cream of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks County, N.D., 253 U.S. 325, 328
(1920); see also 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 91, § 13.4.
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ed by incorporation, however, are greater than the contacts
generated by the creation of a trust by a resident of a particu-
lar state. Further, a corporation may reincorporate in another
state. In contrast, a trust is defined as a taxable "Resident
Trust" ab initio and, once so defined, remains a Resident Trust
until termination. In contrast, an individual may not constitu-
tionally be taxed based merely on her residence at the time of
her birth.m A trust, however, is much more a creature of the
law of the residence of the settlor/testator than an individual is
of the residence of her birth.
Added to this confusion is the fact that testamentary trusts
have a closer relationship to the state of their creation than do
inter vivos trusts. Moreover, it is unclear whether a constitu-
tional limitation on the state income taxation of Resident
Trusts is, from a policy perspective, desirable. Further, a consti-
tutionally sufficient nexus may be generated by the residence of
a trust protector, investment advisor or other party as well as
the trustees and beneficiaries.
If one must draw a conclusion from the various conflicting
decisions and factors, it seems that the more reasonable conclu-
sion is that a state is constitutionally prohibited from imposing
an income tax on the entire income of a trust based solely on
the fact that the trust was created by a resident set-
tlor/testator. This conclusion is consistent with the decided.
weight of authority.' Further, the few cases to the contrary
are atypical.'
253. See Blue, 462 N.W.2d at 764-65.
254. See Blue v. Department of the Treasury, 462 N.W.2d 762 (Mich. Ct. App.
1990); Westfall v. Director of Revenue, 812 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. 1991); Swift v. Director
of Revenue, 727 S.W.2d 880 (Mo. 1987); Potter v. Taxation Div. Dir., 5 N.J. Tax 399
(1983); Pennoyer v. Taxation Div. Dir., 5 N.J. Tax 386 (1983); Mercantile-Safe Deposit
& Trust Co. v. Murphy, 15 N.Y.S.2d 579 (N.Y. 1964); Taylor v. New York State Tax-
ation Comm'n, 445 N.Y.S.2d 648 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
255. In Hutchins v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, 172 N.E. 605
(Mass. 1930), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed the constitu-
tionality of a income tax imposed on a trust based on the residence of the trustee.
This court mentioned, in dicta, that a tax imposed on the basis of the residence of a
settlor/testator would be constitutional. See id. at 608. The continued validity of
Hutchins is questionable. See supra note 23.
District of Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1997),
involved a tax imposed by the District of Columbia. Since the commerce clause does
not limit Congress' power to legislate, even when legislating, merely for the District of
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Most of the cases that have addressed this issue have not
drawn a distinction between the limits imposed by the com-
merce clause and the limits imposed by the due process clause.
This is probably due to the fact that prior to 1992 the Supreme
Court had not clearly enunciated the differences between the
nexus requirements emanating from these two clauses.' Ar-
guably, in 1992 the Supreme Court lowered the nexus require-
ments under the due process clause and left the nexus require-
ments of the commerce clause unchanged. It appears, however,
that an income tax imposed on a trust based solely on the
residence of the settlor/testator may be constitutionally prohib-
ited by both clauses. Under the lower due process nexus re-
quirement, it is obviously more likely that a trust may be found
to have a sufficient nexus with a state based solely on the fact
that the trust was created by a resident of that state. Whether
the constitutionality of such a tax is being evaluated under the
commerce clause or under the due process clause, the basic con-
stitutional shortcoming is the same. Namely, the sole nexus
between the state and such a Resident Trust is an event that
occurred in the past, perhaps the relatively distant past. There
may be no continuing nexus between the state and the trust
except for the contacts, such as the jurisdiction of the state
courts, which are based on the same past event. This is the
unique problem of state income taxation of trusts as opposed to
state income taxation of corporations, individuals or other enti-
ties. Under these circumstances, this event cannot serve as the
constitutional basis for the state income tax in perpetuity.
There must be a constitutional limit to such taxation; at some
point, the nexus established by the creation of the trust by a
resident must wear off.
Such a constitutional limitation is clearly the less workable
conclusion. Absent such a limitation, a trust would simply be
defined as Resident Trust ab initio and its liability to the state
would be similarly determined and immutable. In contrast, such
a constitutional limitation would require the annual evaluation
of the nexus between the state and the trust. 7 Thus, to de-
Columbia, the tax was not challenged on commerce clause grounds. See id. at 541
n.7.
256. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305 (1992).
257. See Virginia Dep't of Tax. Letter Ruling 1993 WL 372991 (Aug. 26, 1993).
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termine the state tax liability of such a trust, one would need
to evaluate whether any trustees, beneficiaries, contingent bene-
ficiaries, trust protectors, investment managers, or other parties
with a connection to the trust were residents of that state or if
the trust held any property in that state. Further, if the trust
avails itself of the state courts during that tax year, this may
also provide a constitutionally sufficient nexus.
It seems that a trust created in a particular state has a
closer relationship to that state during its infancy, i.e., during
the first few years of the trust's existence. Thus, based solely
on the residence of the settlor/testator, a state may constitu-
tionally tax the income of a trust during its first few years of
existence, but may be unable to constitutionally tax the trust in
later years. Of course, the immediate question that arises is
when does the state become constitutionally prohibited from
taxing the trust-when does the nexus wear off? This distinc-
tion, however, defies easy classification and creates a particular-
ly unworkable and administratively difficult standard.
Based on the difficulty of administering such a-constitutional
limitation, the Supreme Court, if it were to decide this issue,
may opt for a "bright-line" test. Of course, there is more than
one possible bright-line test, including only allowing state taxa-
tion of a trust if a trustee is a resident of the state, or allowing
unfettered taxation of a trust by the state of residence set-
tlor/testator. The former alternative, however, would severely
undermine the Resident Trust classification system in place in
many states. Moreover, it would effectively impose a single
method of trust income taxation on the states, and the Court
has been unwilling to impose a single formula for taxation in
similar contexts. The advantages of the bright-line test, howev-
er, are obvious: easy administrability, and the certainty that is
so desirable in the taxation context.' Moreover, the Supreme
Court has recently upheld such a bright-line test based on simi-
lar concerns despite the Court's own admission that such test
was "artificial at its edges." 9 On the other hand, the Su-
258. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 315-16.
259. Id. at 315.
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preme Court went to great pains to limit that decision to the
context of sales and use taxes. 26°
Thus, if the Supreme Court were to address this issue today,
it is unclear how it would, or should, rule. On the one hand, its
precedent supports such a constitutional limitation. On the
other hand, the Supreme Court has recently voiced the need for
certainty and bright-line tests in an area that has been de-
scribed by the Court as a "quagmire."28 1 Perhaps this issue
can be best addressed in the following context: is it equitable
for a state to exact a tax from a trust if the trust has had no
connection to that state since the moment of its creation de-
cades ago? 2 Probably not.
It is, however, clear that the current uncertainty regarding
the constitutional limitations on the state income taxation of
Resident Trusts costs the state treasuries in terms of lost reve-
nue. If a Resident Trust has connections to the state that are
arguably inadequate to constitutionally support the income
taxation of the trust by the state, then the trustee may reason-
ably take the position that the trust owes no income tax to that
state and has no obligation to file state income tax returns. The
only way for the state to contest the trustee's position is to
audit the trust, which may be difficult since the trust likely
files no tax return. Moreover, even if such a Resident Trust is
unlucky enough to be audited and a state income tax liability is
finally determined, the trust would owe merely the back tax
and, perhaps, interest. Penalties are unlikely since the trustee's
position was based on the theory that the state was constitu-
tionally prohibited from taxing the trust-a theory that may
easily be classified as reasonable in most close cases given the
current uncertainty in the state of the law. In this case, the
trust is in no worse a position for having lost the "audit lottery"
than if the trust had paid the income tax in a timely fashion. It
may owe interest, however, if the trustee had the funds to
invest while the interest was accruing. Therefore, since there is
little downside to losing the audit lottery, a Resident Trust
with little, or even moderate, connection to the state of resi-
260. See id. at 317-18.
261. See id. at 315.
262. See supra notes 212-20 and accompanying text.
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dence is effectively encouraged to take the position that taxa-
tion of the trust by the state is constitutionally prohibited.
To assuage this uncertainty regarding the constitutional lim-
its on the state income taxation of Resident Trusts, and prevent
the resulting losses to the state treasuries, one may look to
either the courts or the legislature. The state courts and/or the
federal courts may attempt to clearly delineate these constitu-
tional limits. This approach, however, seems unlikely to be
successful in eliminating the uncertainty in this area. The Su-
preme Court describes its own case law regarding constitutional
limitations on state taxation as a "quagmire."' Moreover, as
discussed above, even the very thorough analysis of this issue
undertaken by the Swift court leaves substantial unanswered
questions regarding the extent of these constitutional limits. '
In short, court attention has been unable to bring clarity to this
or closely related areas up to this point and it seems unreason-
able to expect it to do so in the future.
Thus, if the current uncertainty regarding the constitution-
al limits on the state taxation of Resident Trusts is to be elimi-
nated, the state legislatures must act. One possibility is for the
state legislatures to follow the example of the states that em-
ploy the Resident Trust taxation system, but exempt a Resident
Trust from taxation if the connection between the state and the
trust is attenuated.' These exemptions do not, however,
eliminate the uncertainty in this area.' Moreover, this course
of action leaves unchanged a taxation system that bases the
taxation of trusts on the "constitutionally suspect" Resident
Trust classification. 7
263. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 315.
264. See supra, notes 185-98 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 40-71 and accompanying text.
266. For example, Connecticut Resident Trusts with no present connection to the
state of Connecticut are exempt from taxation by Connecticut only if the trust is
inter vivos. A testamentary Connecticut Resident Trust with no current connection to
the state is taxed on all of its income. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
In contrast, the New Jersey Tax Court has held that a similarly situated testamenta-
ry New Jersey Resident Trust may not constitutionally be taxed by New Jersey. See
Pennoyer v. Taxation Div. Dir., 5 N.J. Tax 386 (1983).
267. Blue v. Department of the Treasury, 462 N.W.2d 762, 764 (Mich. Ct. App.
1990).
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In order to truly eliminate the uncertainty in this area,
and prevent the resulting losses to the state treasuries, the
state legislature must act proactively. The states should aban-
don the Resident Trust classification system since it is constitu-
tionally flawed and fails to account for changing events that
occur during the existence of the trust. In its place, the states
may adopt a system that bases the state taxation of trusts on
current connections between the state and the trust, such as
the residence of the trustees or beneficiaries." In addition to
avoiding the constitutional issues inherent in the Resident
Trust taxation system, such a system has the added advantage
in that it reflects the current nexus between the trust and the
various states. Until the states abandon the "constitutionally
suspect7' Resident Trust classification system, the state tax-
ation of trusts will likely remain mired in uncertainty regarding
the constitutional limits on the states' power to tax.
268. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has ex-
plicitly held that taxation of a trust based on the residence of the trustees is consti-
tutional. See Greenough v. Tax Assessors, 331 U.S. 486, 486 (1947). The Greenough
Court also noted that the residence of the trustees "may be preferred for a single
tax". Id.
269. Blue, 462 N.W.2d at 764.
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